Defining Nation Branding in Middle Power Public Diplomacy

Geopolitics have consistently evolved since the Cold War, and have given rise to a large number of nations which ascribe to a status referred to as a ‘Middle Power’. These nations, South Africa, South Korea, Canada and Australia among them, have attained a level of stability, ingenuity or leadership in a certain domestic sectors, which enable them to compete with superpowers such as the United States and China. However, these nations are still dealing with internal or international development in other facets.


One way in which middle powers can attempt to assert themselves against conceptions of inferiority is nation branding, or the process of acutely strategizing information, products and practices that positively affect how other countries view them. These branding strategies are oftentimes synonymous with other diplomatic or public diplomacy efforts.


In my opinion, nation branding retains the ability to be classified as or synonymous with public diplomacy only if it meets certain conditions. If the intention behind the nation brand is to advance a state’s foreign policy agenda (whether that be through multilateral partnerships, soft power strategies, economic ties, etc.) then I believe it should be considered an arm of public diplomacy, as it does assist in the control over image, message and attractiveness of a state.  Ideally, the nation brand reflects an accurate depiction of the country. When this image is not depicted correctly, there can be disagreements from such parties as the foreign public, the international media or the domestic public.  This is exemplified in the Brand Kenya campaign, where Kenyan nationals are shown to not have a high level of patriotism due to internal conditions like importation, violence and corruption.


What I do not believe is public diplomacy is when a national branding strategy is created for purely commercial purposes. Within this context, nation branding is more closely related to propaganda or advertising, as there is not always the guarantee of legitimacy or credibility behind the image or message and there may not be ample space for dialogue within the strategy. Association is also a factor. Brand Kenya, although a legitimate nation brand, was crafted by PR firm Interbrand Sampson, which also has commercial products such as AT&T and Wrigley in their repertoire. Eytan Gilboa reflected on this when he noted that nation brands must be prepared to be very flexible with their product, as public diplomacy is a fluid process.


I think it is also crucial to consider intention of nation branding strategies that do not have foreign policy goals besides increasing international recognition and attractiveness. Popularity in the international arena is not public diplomacy because it should not be an end in itself, but rather a means to an end of specific foreign policy objectives.


It may be easy for a ‘middle power’ to consider their nation branding strategy a form of public diplomacy, despite the fact there are purely commercial entities conducting it. As is also described by Gilboa, middle powers are characteristically strapped for resources in public diplomacy, yet must constantly strive to remain sustainable and influential within their sector, lest succumb to the fluidity of the geopolitical sphere.  

My response to "The Limits of Country Branding"

"The Limits of Country Branding"

My response to classmate Alejandro Neyra's post found by clicking here.

The Boston Globe makes note of the nation-building as a trend, reporting on how “the last few years have seen an explosion of ‘nation-branding,’ shorthand for coordinated government efforts to manage a country's image, whether to improve tourism, investment, or even foreign relations” (Risen, 2005). As Alejandro points out, Mexico, South Korea, and other middle powers are no exception. These middle powers are invested in gaining soft power, 'top of mind awareness,' cultural leverage, and a means to foster mutually beneficial relationships with its own constituents, prospective investors, potential customers, and/or other countries. Cesar Villanueva Rivas highlights how some countries, such as Mexico, are compelled to remake its image in effort to dispel the negative press that has plagued the country since it experienced a surge in "narco-violence." Other developing middle powers, such as South Korea, are trying to polish their public image to foster their influence. This is illustrated in Sook-Jung Lee's briefing on "South Korea's Soft Power Diplomacy," where he underscores how "South Korea’s national image and values for [the brand concept of a] Global Korea should be prosperous, democratic, modest, nonthreatening, and culturally syncretic, since many Third World countries see South Korea as a model with its simultaneous achievement of development and democratization” (Lee, 2009). One tactic indispensable to South Korea's branding strategy relies on translating its commercial and private sector success--Samsung's or LG's brand power for example--into soft power. The other tactic that is critical to South Korea's branding strategy is that it must follow through with the realization that branding, to put it in Alejandro's words, "is not only about having a commercial logo or a catchy slogan," but about building trust and fostering a credible rapport with the public.

This tactic goes beyond branding and moves into the realm of public diplomacy, which not only promotes the understanding of a nation's brand, but also the understanding of its culture, heritage, and people. In a sense, governments seeking to create their own brands and grow brand value also want to “develop [an] emotional, positive reaction between their part of the world and citizens...[they] want to make or re-make their image in the world to gain clout vis-à-vis their neighbors to achieve certain political ends” (Youde, 2009). In order to pique and develop the public's empathy for and/or sense of connection to a brand, a nation must look to its public diplomacy programming. As Alejandro also notes, public diplomacy is intrinsic to branding—and not secondary to it—because it provides various groups with the possibility to interact with, learn from, and connect to others. In other words, branding alone has its limits, but when combined with public diplomacy and people-to-people initiatives, the two have the power to building bridge across cultures, fostering mutual understanding within a larger regional or global community.

Just as branding is indispensable to shaping and communicating brand value, so too is public diplomacy to “helping audiences identify with” nation-states and “encouraging them to buy its products and services” (van Ham, 2002). And just as Lee emphasizes how “the soft power of a country operates in constant interaction with its hard power,” so too does public diplomacy operate in tandem with nation-branding.

New Resources, New Challenges for Indian Public Diplomacy

There is no such thing as a seamless public diplomacy strategy. Throughout our readings and research we have seen that in the process of projecting an attractive and legitimate image to a foreign public there has always been some internal or external factor that inhibits its full effect. In the case of China, the deterrent was its history of human rights abuses and stifled response to crises. In Taiwan, it was a lack of involvement on the international stage in multi-lateral relations and associations. In Japan, it was too much focus on spreading popular culture and not enough on promoting their foreign policy agenda.

Now we have India, the world's largest democracy, that is dealing with its own set of unique opportunities and pitfalls in public diplomacy. I will detail these as "resources" and "challenges".

Resources:

India has a very advanced IT sector, which puts it in a great position to use this as leverage for public diplomacy strategies. Examples of utilizing this strength come in the form of adaptation to e-diplomacy, e-governance, ICT4D and digital diplomacy via social networks or other means of transnational communication. The Ministry of External Affairs website exemplifies many of these characteristics as they reach out via Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, have enabled platforms for Indian diasporics to connect and publish content regularly.

Another resource is what is referred to as the "soft" aspect of their hard power. Politically, they are the world's largest democracy and a long-standing one at that. Although it hasn't been widely noticed on a global scale, it has had an affect on regional democracy building in places like Nepal and Pakistan. India is in a position to use their history to actively promote politically to some of the world's most sensitive areas like Iran and Syria, which aligns India closer in relations to the US.

Jumping off of that point, India still maintains its appeal to developing states. Because India is still in many ways developing itself, it can easily reach out and form relationships with Asian, Middle Eastern or African countries for purposes of mutual development. This has already been started with the Indiafrica project, seeking to build relations between African countries and India.

Challenges:

One glaring challenge for India is that it is late in the game of public diplomacy. Although their presence is definitely felt in, they only began implementing public diplomacy in 2006 and are still experimenting with how exactly to apply it in an Indian context that will encapsulate the state.

This presents another issue for India, diversity. Attempts to brand or project a unified India are extremely difficult due to a diverse and complex demographic, consisting of many ethnic groups, languages, religions, castes, political groups and economic statuses. This harkens some of the same troubles even the US has in nation-branding, as it houses an array of citizens and many times it is difficult to convey one image or culture to foreign publics.

As is the case with many states, there is confusion between the foreign and the domestic audience in public diplomacy. India seems to be targeting Indians for development purposes as well as foreign publics who they would like to be aware of what is happening in the state. However, the question then becomes whether their credibility is being compromised by doing this. Internal studies show that Indians do not feel their country is strong or powerful enough to have influence over other nations, which indicates that different narratives need to be employed for foreign and domestic audiences.

Finally, India has followed in the footsteps of Japan and South Korea by overtly projecting culture and tourism to foreign audiences rather than taking a stance on foreign policy or even integrating that stance into their cultural communications. The Incredible India campaign has been very popular and visitors to India have increased significantly, but is this public diplomacy or is this tourism? Can it be both? This goes along with their soft power approach, and it has had some success, but in continued efforts there should be some policy backing. Otherwise India will be liked but not seen as powerful or influential, which is the opposite intention of PD strategy.

In a quick summation, I would argue that India needs to engage its domestic audience in a nationalistic campaign, uniting them under one India and boosting self-image. This is a key starting point before public diplomacy will function for them. Then, once this is improved, India can begin engaging their citizenry or government with foreign publics using their advanced IT arena, not only promoting culture but backing that up with a democratic or developmental goal. This way, other nations will look to India for influence or aid when it comes to political or economic factors, thereby giving India a large foothold. The effect should be cyclical, as this increased attention will strengthen India's name and importance on a global scale while simultaneously improving self-image.

Taiwan: Shadow or Nation?

What are the challenges and opportunities for Taiwanese public diplomacy?

Paul Rockower outlines a number of suitable opportunities for Taiwan to seize as it continues to address the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China next door. He suggests that Taiwan embrace and advertise its cultural offerings—by assembling a traveling night market—as well as its strategic geopolitical location, democratic values, and economic strength.

With its robust economy and classification as a middle power, Taiwan’s political capital and opportunities rest largely on its promotion of a democratic model, allocation of foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and engagement in polylateral and track II methods of diplomacy as well as on its strategic location vis-à-vis U.S. interests in safeguarding its Pacific presence.

Opportunities for elevating Taiwanese soft power and influence abound: not only could Taiwan construct interactive outposts, online Taiwan Academies and promote gastrodiplomacy programs to represent its interests, heritage, and cultural importance as the true heir of Chinese culture—it could increase its soft power and influence through the expanding on the niches available. Taiwan would reap rewards for pivoting its terms of diplomatic engagement to focus on two key areas, international communication technologies (ICT) and urban housing and development design. Its expertise in these two indispensable topics would likely be universally appreciated.

Since 2007, Taiwan’s sphere of legitimate influence has steadily shrunk, however, despite the government’s efforts at checkbook diplomacy and aid engagement. For example, the government of Costa Rica, which recognized Taiwan as sovereign for over several decades, suddenly switched its allegiance to the PRC overnight—perhaps because it was attracted to Beijing’s offer to build the Costa Rican national stadium in San Jose. Today less than 25 countries officially recognize Taiwan.

Taiwan will continue to face the threat of an ever-expanding China whose enormous assets (i.e. ICT company Huawei Technologies) and mammoth influence will become increasingly difficult to compete with, given its size and scope. And although Taiwan’s aid program managed to broker diplomatic ties throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the same judgment cannot be made today. As R. Ellis highlights, global perception and reception of China is changing for a number of reasons. A growing number of developing countries especially are attracted to China because they bear “hopes for future access to Chinese markets and investment,” interest in China’s role as a possible “counterweight to the United States and Western institutions, and admire its successful economic development model.

As fewer and fewer countries recognize Taiwan and as it is forced to manufacture a “Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics” for public consumption, it is evident that Taiwan’s weight is not what it once was. Only time and strategy will tell whether Taiwan will be able to meet the difficulties posed by its neighbor.

Embracing Collaborative Power and Accountability

Following Slaughter and Fisher, can the idea of "Power Over" be reconciled with an ethic of "Power with?" Put another way, can public diplomacy practitioners truly embrace “collaborative power” and still be accountable?

In capitalizing on the use of social media tools in an ever-globalized and interconnected world, can public diplomacy practitioners truly embrace Ali Fisher’s “facilitative approach” and emphasis on the periphery as well as Anne-Marie Slaughter’s “collaborative power” and still be accountable?

As Gary Weaver keenly observed, “When people communicate, they send messages, not meanings” (“The Re-Entry Process,” 1987). The narratives constructed through the use of collaborative power often will take on a life and meaning of their own, resulting in offshoots organizations, visions, and narratives. While the merits of top-down relational power practices will continue to shine and suit certain contexts, as Fisher points out, other contexts may require practitioners to engage in “power with” foreign, third-party partners. In such a scenario these practitioners may stand to gain greater credibility in the eyes of their partners, but they are no longer solely responsible for the outcome that results from embracing collaborative power. Instead, they are part of a much larger phenomenon of collective engagement and empowerment, which shares collective narrative and accountability in influencing the images, meaning, and understanding of messages.

Fisher highlights how, in the practice of public diplomacy, there is a “division between those that seek to exert ‘power over’ a target audience and those that intend to engage or empower a community” (“Looking at the Man in the Mirror,” pg. 273). The former tendency is often associated an organization’s core or top-down approach of exercising influence, while the latter is often practiced on the margins or periphery of a network.

Fisher also points out that the difference between ‘power over’ versus ‘power with’ is rooted in a number of issues, namely: (1) The struggle to align an organization’s messages and actions (contradictions and discrepancies between the two threaten credibility); (2) the dynamics of “state-based author-audience power relationship” and influence of domestic constituents; (3) the pressure to home one’s public diplomacy focus on “self-centered language rather than genuine engagement” with foreign publics; (4) identifying power relationships—whether core or periphery—within a network; and (5) defining and measuring success.

In seeking to articulate the modern “phenomenon…[of] networked, horizontal…and sustained application of collective will and resources” in this age of Twitter and other powerful social media tools, Slaughter seeks to complement Joseph Nye’s theory of relational power by articulating a theory on “collaborative power” and distinguishing it as one categorical form of soft power (The Atlantic, November 30, 2011). As Slaughter points out in her article, Nye defines relational power as the “capacity” to take action and achieve desired outcomes in certain social situations. His argument features three facets of relational power—the ability to command change, control agendas, and shape preferences—all facilitated through a top-down approach.

In contrast, collaborative power emphasizes the strength of open-sourced networking and the influence of “community organization” and empowerment. In Slaughter’s words, “collaborative power” is defined as “the power of many to do together what no one can do alone.” Collaborative power, or the power-with approach has the power to effect positive change through mutually beneficial partnerships--one case illustrating this is developing relationship between the United States and Myanmar's burgeoning democracy. Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton's admiration of, direct engagement, and partnership with democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has certainly empowered and quickened the process of democratization in the Southeast Asian country. With Western support and co-coordination, the Burmese were able to successfully hold parliamentary elections earlier this year.

Fisher and Slaughter make several interesting observations. One key observation is a reminder of how long ago, Karl Deutsch underscored the importance and significance of “community” (288). Sophisticated yet informal community organizing and use of “collaborative power” when well-placed has the potential to achieve tremendous outcomes. We see this when Anne-Marie Slaughter buttresses her argument with the example of Andrew Carvin’s #FreeMona hashtag, which trended worldwide on Twitter soon after its creation and helped to publicize and track the activist’s story—all while likely influencing global perception of the horrors of Mubarak’s administration. A second observation Fisher shares is the need to oscillate between the core-centric approach of the old-fashioned hub-and-spokes style of public diplomacy (and control of information exchange) and the newer peripheral practice or “facilitative approach of niche diplomacy where the benefit comes from helping others to achieve their goals” (281). Finally, he emphasizes the importance in recognizing the “importance and influence” of those on the periphery of communication networks (288). While both the “core and the periphery have vital roles,” it is evident that those who are marginalized, beyond the pale, or in the periphery are likely to first adopt an innovation and become “boundary spanners.”

In other words, the periphery is open soil in what Fisher identifies as the rich “inflow and outflow of knowledge and innovation” can take root and flourish. Throughout history, marginalized individuals have succeeded in gaining ground through collaborative networks of power and community organizing—to use post-colonial examples, Frantz Fanon, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. were all those once located on the periphery, beyond the pale.

To ensure their credibility in their embrace of collaborative power, public diplomacy practitioners must look to foster what Fisher terms as genuine dialogue, for which there must be “an element in which both sides are prepared to shift their position” (278). The key to influencing hearts and minds, it seems, lies in empowering publics to be open to change and/or new understandings of identity. In an ideal world, public diplomacy practitioners, boundary spanners, and partners alike would all gladly be held accountable for opening channels of exchange.

"New Diplomacy?" I think not

What does it mean for diplomacy to be a "behavior" as much as an "institution?" What does this mean for public diplomacy?

Kelley’s argument about the evolution and pluralization of diplomacy is a firm reminder to us all that despite what purists may think, diplomacy—like many arts or sciences—is a living, breathing craft capable of change, improvement, and progression—or even regression. It is also a craft and tool that can be acquired by all those who are willing to learn to wield it. Thus, agenda-setting and action are no longer in the hands of state actors, Kelley argues.

He fails to make note, however, that agenda-setting and actions never were entirely in the hands of state actors. Thus, it’s not that the gaping chasm of unequal influence of nation-states and non-state agents has healed itself, it’s just that as ICTs continued to develop and accessibility to these technologies begun spread in the 21st century, technological diffusion takes place. The quill pen gives way to the wing of an electronic Tweet. More people have access, and access helps to empower, and empowerment certainly sways influence, however, this phenomenon does not replace the functions of diplomacy as an institution.

Instead, Kelley’s brand of “new diplomacy” is not a new mode of behavior; it is an improved means of communication, networking, and negotiating in the globalized dynamics of our modern world.

Critical to note is Kelley’s point about populations and their identification with transnational concerns. In our globalized world, political, economic, and social concerns are no longer local, but international—and in being international, they transcend traditional boundaries set forth by the nation-state. As a result, the global public is increasingly likely to “‘relocate’ authority to a non-state entity or figure, which in turn enables the non-state actor to amass moral legitimacy and to influence the behavior of states from the outside” (289). Kelley calls these non-state actors the “new diplomats.”

While they do maneuver “within the state system and command authority across it,” these non-state actors highlighted in the article are not diplomats in the traditional sense, period. They are also not the “new diplomats,” as Kelley is fond of labeling them. Calling these non-state actors ‘diplomats’ is a misnomer. Instead, these non-state actors are tremendous networks of influence—but they are not diplomats. They are polymaths, masters of their technological savvy, and well-connected free agents eager to secure their own agenda through diplomatic behavior and engagement. In the 21st century they continue to engage in diplomacy just as they always have, except now they are armed and more deeply embedded in the minds and hearts of the public through their activity with social media and ICTs.

In repeatedly highlighting the demise of diplomacy as an institution and its proliferation as a behavior, Kelley reveals his epiphany while seemingly ignoring how throughout history, non-state actors—such as corporate actors—have always had a hand (or a fist) in negotiating (and racketing) policy in international affairs. The institution of diplomacy is open to progression, improvements, and technological diffusion. Non-state actors have gained greater primacy and strength in their ability to positively contribute to their public diplomacy of choice, but they have not replaced their official counterparts. Diplomats continue to function as official representatives of their states abroad, constrained always by protocol, but distinguished by their responsibility to serve and their ability to discern and navigate the delicate negotiations that must take place at the decentralized table of modern diplomacy.

Social Media & Communication Flows of Public Diplomacy

Despite assumptions regarding social media as a space meant for the proliferation of pointless quips and equally pointless content, the mere fact that civil society now has the ability to interact on these platforms without the control or approval of the state provides an entirely subversive aspect to state-controlled public diplomacy, an area of both national and international importance.

As author Peter Van Ham notes in Social Power in International Politics, the public diplomacy environment formerly mediated much at the hands of state actors is now being altered into a more multi-directional scene where the state, NGOs, international orgs, individuals and other actors can produce and consume information directly, thereby weakening state control. Often this process plays out in social media technologies where actors can take messages into their own hands.

However, the state should not be discounted in the social media realm. In fact, the state or other actors can take on a mediator role in all three typologies of public diplomacy, as outlined by Cowan and Arsenault in Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: Three Layers of Public Diplomacy. This is because the three typologies are based upon communication strategies that can be easily employed by any entity engaging with a foreign public. I’ll describe how each typology can engage publics with social media: 

Monological 

Although monological or one-way communication where one entity transmits a message to an audience may seem to contradict the very nature of social media it actually can be an effective way of engaging with foreign publics. Making the choice to participate in social media platforms does not automatically open up the way for dialogical or collaborative forms of public diplomacy. An actor can create an account on a social media platform such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr or Pinterest and solely utilize that platform to amass a following and promote information carefully crafted in tune with their particular interest.

Monological communication on social media is advantageous because actors can target audiences according to these particular interests and goals, gain heightened visibility fast and reach a wide swath of active users. Although there can be commentary or feedback given to the actor by its community, the actor has control over the choice to reciprocate or not.

The downside to monological communication is that the information promoted isn’t able to be contained within the confines of the group. Social media is meant to be shared and users can/will disseminate messages further to estranged groups that may not have the desired reaction. A way the actor can assuage a hostile reaction to their public diplomacy effort is to ensure prior to sending out the initial communication many various viewpoints and perspectives are considered. An actor can also provide carefully crafted responses back to users, but this would break the monologic aspect of the public diplomacy effort. 

Dialogical 

Dialogical public diplomacy works well with social media because of the necessity to create a conversation between the actor and audience. Social media features like commenting, re-tweeting, ‘liking’, instant messaging and texting can help actors gauge public opinion surrounding their perspective as well as the importance foreign publics weigh on certain topics. This could be a good method for an actor to get ideas flowing for a project or a way to foster intercultural exchange. Again, this is advantageous to actors because dialogical communications can be targeted to interested groups where the actor can initiate and steer the dialogue in certain directions.

The negative aspect of dialogical public diplomacy is that, again, the communications can be driven away from the control of the actor and may veer off in a separate direction than originally intended. There are also competing dialogical conversations that are started within many other contexts that may tangentially or directly influence or challenge the goals and perspectives of an actor.


Collaborative 

Certain types of social media outlets are uniquely appropriate for collaborative public diplomacy. Because the goal in this effort is to produce a product from the contributions of many, open-source projects like the Linux operating system or the Drupal content management system are particularly relevant. In these, any users who are interested are encouraged to assist in the creation and maintenance of the product. The public diplomacy goal that results from collaboration is a sense of common ground and shared loyalty/experience to a goal by all members despite observed differences.

Easy ways to utilize collaborative public diplomacy is in working with wikis, file-sharing systems like Google Docs and mass-multiplayer role-playing games like Second Life or World of Warcraft. Each of these allow for users to personally take on responsibilities and contribute to the building or maintenance of a greater initiative. The potential downside to collaborative public diplomacy is that users must be involved from the ground floor or else they will not establish the necessary trust and social capital needed to foster the bond. Ensuring the collaborative project forces cross-cultural groups to view issues in a different light is particularly challenging, but if done correctly and assist in such areas as conflict resolution.

I think it is imperative to understand that social media is not a magic bullet for public diplomacy. Social media is the next innovation following other revolutionary technologies such as radio, television and the Internet. Although it has brought all actors in society closer together at an unprecedented rate, it is best to realize these capabilities are only as effective as the actors that use them. As Van Ham notes, technological progression must be met with human agency and the correct political economy to flourish.

What do you mean when you say this picture is propagandistic?

How does Black's extensive exploration of propaganda help us understand its distinction - if any - from public diplomacy?

In the post-Cold War era, the word ‘propaganda’ still casts a long, dark shadow in the English language. As Black highlights in his article, “Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda,” the term often brings to mind a practice that is sinister and unethical, despite its origins as a moral duty in the Roman Catholic Church. Propaganda—as it is understood in the aftermath of the Cold War—is seemingly inseparable from “manipulation and control, if not outright coercion,” and an unfair “power imbalance…between propagandists and propagandees” (121).

By exploring “how people perceive the world and how they subsequently communicate their perceptions or misperceptions,” Black’s analysis identifies more commonalities than differences between propaganda and public diplomacy (130). Black’s exploration of propaganda underscores how difficult it is to disentangle the two terms, since both practices are nuanced, varied, and dependent on individual orientations and belief systems.

In considering whether or not public diplomacy is distinct from propaganda, I conclude that it depends on the number of the aforementioned factors. The most primary factors are: (1) The intention of the information communicator(s) and (2) The belief systems of information receiver(s). How does the information communicator package information? Do they attempt to package it in a non-propagandistic manner? In turn, how do information receivers seek and process their information? Do they seek varied sources of information (as Rokeach’s open-minded individual would) and question what they learn? Or do they seek a monochromatic source of information and accept what they learn without question?

Ultimately, in U.S. democratic society, public diplomacy programs—be they U.S. or foreign—are recognizable competitors and contributors to the pluralist marketplace of ideas. They embody forms of “propagandas that challenge all of us—producers and consumers—to wisely sift and sort through them” (135). This is not likely the case in a closed society, such as Iran or North Korea. Therefore, the term ‘propaganda’ has a wide spectrum of nuanced significance, striking positive, negative, and all connotations between.

While Black concludes that propaganda is characterized by at least six specific characteristics, I believe whether or not public diplomacy fits the definition of propaganda depends entirely on how an individual, organization, or country elects to execute its public diplomacy program. If a public diplomacy program does possess all of the six characteristics, then it certainly seems heavily propagandistic. However, if a public diplomacy program such as the U.S. Embassy of Vietnam’s public diplomacy program—which elects to not emphasize the catastrophes of the Vietnam War—upholds a “time perspective characterized by an overemphasis or under-emphasis on the past, present, or future as disconnected periods rather than a demonstrated consciousness of time flow”—is it not also a bit propagandistic?

Perhaps, as Black suggests, an overemphasis or underemphasis on history may be intentional. It may also be unconscious, rooted in a certain view of the world, particular belief systems, “their personal and institutional loyalties, and their semantic behaviors” which may have propagandistic tendencies (135). Propaganda and public diplomacy cannot be understood in binary terms. Instead, they are very much nuanced, varied, and dependent on the orientations and tendencies of information senders and receivers in each unique communication exchange.

Propaganda or Public Diplomacy? An Analysis of Critical Factors

In the realm of public diplomacy, the battle over foreign hearts and minds can all too often seem akin to the familiar tactics of the advertising and marketing agencies that inundate American culture. There are advocates of traditional diplomacy that warn the practices of public diplomacy and the “new public diplomacy” fall too heavily on the side of propaganda, which has a much more contentious connotation.

However, when juxtaposing Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda, a piece by Jay Black, with the public diplomacy contributions of Melissen, Gilboa, and Cull, the fine lines that separate the two fields become a bit clearer. Black articulates historical conceptions of propaganda, noting that it has always been associated with negative aspects of power. This is now extended to the process of introducing ideas and information to a group with the intent to have them react the same way both psychologically and in their actions. It is here that propaganda may be confused with public diplomacy, where information and ideas are being introduced to foreign publics with the intent to ultimately provide a favorable view of the of the state.

To combat this perception, there are a few clear differences to note. First, in propaganda the style of communication tends to be one-way from a sender to a receiver. Public diplomacy directly contradicts this notion, as the method by which publics are being engaged is via two-way communications, most notably by emerging and participatory media or information communication technologies. Melissen, a proponent of this concept, noted that a major tenet of public diplomacy is how this builds a relationship between two states where there is mutual gain. Cull compounds this notion by listing ‘Listening’ as the most crucial concept of public diplomacy in the UK. In light of this, we can draw yet another difference: propaganda focuses on identifying conflicts or competition on its audience while public diplomacy strives for cooperation and exchange.

Intention of the message is also a topic of discussion. In propaganda, there is often a clearly defined and easily identifiable goal of the communication, and this goal can be moral or immoral with whatever values laden within it. Public diplomacy also must have a clearly communicated intent or goal, but goals are often not easily attained or identifiable, as international relations is a complex and muddled field that is affected by many other influences such as economic or political conditions. Moreover, Gilboa stated that these conditions are never fixed, as they can be in propaganda.

This leads to the next point, which is the conception of time between the two. Black asserted that propaganda is solely concerned on the implementation of information and persuasion in an immediate or short time frame, while public diplomacy is assumed to be focused on multiple time frames, with short, medium and long term goals in mind.

Despite all of these observed differences, I believe there is a process of unification with the recent developments in communication technology. As was stated, the realms of public diplomacy and public relations are melding, as attractiveness and reputation are becoming the new markers of power in the world. Both Melissen and Black each point out that public diplomacy and propaganda have undergone a critical change with the dawn of the information age in their own field, but I assert these should be thought of together. Propaganda and public diplomacy are now being both produced and consumed not only by states, but by a host of actors, including individuals themselves. It harkens Melissen’s polylateralism, where all entities now have the power to influence foreign publics. We can create our own ad or information campaigns and, depending upon the platform, time, and spread of the information, they can greatly affect international relations or conceptions. I believe this is happening to public relations/advertising and public diplomacy simultaneously, and I think it further complicates the ways in which the two can be separated – who is to say an ad campaign that positively affects a foreign public is not a form of public diplomacy or vice versa?

This will need further analysis as more cases come out, but I wanted to raise the initial question.