What are the challenges and opportunities for Taiwanese public diplomacy?
Paul Rockower outlines a number of suitable opportunities for Taiwan to seize as it continues to address the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China next door. He suggests that Taiwan embrace and advertise its cultural offerings—by assembling a traveling night market—as well as its strategic geopolitical location, democratic values, and economic strength.
With its robust economy and classification as a middle power, Taiwan’s political capital and opportunities rest largely on its promotion of a democratic model, allocation of foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and engagement in polylateral and track II methods of diplomacy as well as on its strategic location vis-à-vis U.S. interests in safeguarding its Pacific presence.
Opportunities for elevating Taiwanese soft power and influence abound: not only could Taiwan construct interactive outposts, online Taiwan Academies and promote gastrodiplomacy programs to represent its interests, heritage, and cultural importance as the true heir of Chinese culture—it could increase its soft power and influence through the expanding on the niches available. Taiwan would reap rewards for pivoting its terms of diplomatic engagement to focus on two key areas, international communication technologies (ICT) and urban housing and development design. Its expertise in these two indispensable topics would likely be universally appreciated.
Since 2007, Taiwan’s sphere of legitimate influence has steadily shrunk, however, despite the government’s efforts at checkbook diplomacy and aid engagement. For example, the government of Costa Rica, which recognized Taiwan as sovereign for over several decades, suddenly switched its allegiance to the PRC overnight—perhaps because it was attracted to Beijing’s offer to build the Costa Rican national stadium in San Jose. Today less than 25 countries officially recognize Taiwan.
Taiwan will continue to face the threat of an ever-expanding China whose enormous assets (i.e. ICT company Huawei Technologies) and mammoth influence will become increasingly difficult to compete with, given its size and scope. And although Taiwan’s aid program managed to broker diplomatic ties throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the same judgment cannot be made today. As R. Ellis highlights, global perception and reception of China is changing for a number of reasons. A growing number of developing countries especially are attracted to China because they bear “hopes for future access to Chinese markets and investment,” interest in China’s role as a possible “counterweight to the United States and Western institutions, and admire its successful economic development model.
As fewer and fewer countries recognize Taiwan and as it is forced to manufacture a “Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics” for public consumption, it is evident that Taiwan’s weight is not what it once was. Only time and strategy will tell whether Taiwan will be able to meet the difficulties posed by its neighbor.
Showing posts with label power. Show all posts
Showing posts with label power. Show all posts
Thursday, June 7, 2012
Thursday, May 24, 2012
"New Diplomacy?" I think not
What does it mean for diplomacy to be a "behavior" as much as an "institution?" What does this mean for public diplomacy?
Kelley’s argument about the evolution and pluralization of diplomacy is a firm reminder to us all that despite what purists may think, diplomacy—like many arts or sciences—is a living, breathing craft capable of change, improvement, and progression—or even regression. It is also a craft and tool that can be acquired by all those who are willing to learn to wield it. Thus, agenda-setting and action are no longer in the hands of state actors, Kelley argues.
He fails to make note, however, that agenda-setting and actions never were entirely in the hands of state actors. Thus, it’s not that the gaping chasm of unequal influence of nation-states and non-state agents has healed itself, it’s just that as ICTs continued to develop and accessibility to these technologies begun spread in the 21st century, technological diffusion takes place. The quill pen gives way to the wing of an electronic Tweet. More people have access, and access helps to empower, and empowerment certainly sways influence, however, this phenomenon does not replace the functions of diplomacy as an institution.
Instead, Kelley’s brand of “new diplomacy” is not a new mode of behavior; it is an improved means of communication, networking, and negotiating in the globalized dynamics of our modern world.
Critical to note is Kelley’s point about populations and their identification with transnational concerns. In our globalized world, political, economic, and social concerns are no longer local, but international—and in being international, they transcend traditional boundaries set forth by the nation-state. As a result, the global public is increasingly likely to “‘relocate’ authority to a non-state entity or figure, which in turn enables the non-state actor to amass moral legitimacy and to influence the behavior of states from the outside” (289). Kelley calls these non-state actors the “new diplomats.”
While they do maneuver “within the state system and command authority across it,” these non-state actors highlighted in the article are not diplomats in the traditional sense, period. They are also not the “new diplomats,” as Kelley is fond of labeling them. Calling these non-state actors ‘diplomats’ is a misnomer. Instead, these non-state actors are tremendous networks of influence—but they are not diplomats. They are polymaths, masters of their technological savvy, and well-connected free agents eager to secure their own agenda through diplomatic behavior and engagement. In the 21st century they continue to engage in diplomacy just as they always have, except now they are armed and more deeply embedded in the minds and hearts of the public through their activity with social media and ICTs.
In repeatedly highlighting the demise of diplomacy as an institution and its proliferation as a behavior, Kelley reveals his epiphany while seemingly ignoring how throughout history, non-state actors—such as corporate actors—have always had a hand (or a fist) in negotiating (and racketing) policy in international affairs. The institution of diplomacy is open to progression, improvements, and technological diffusion. Non-state actors have gained greater primacy and strength in their ability to positively contribute to their public diplomacy of choice, but they have not replaced their official counterparts. Diplomats continue to function as official representatives of their states abroad, constrained always by protocol, but distinguished by their responsibility to serve and their ability to discern and navigate the delicate negotiations that must take place at the decentralized table of modern diplomacy.
Kelley’s argument about the evolution and pluralization of diplomacy is a firm reminder to us all that despite what purists may think, diplomacy—like many arts or sciences—is a living, breathing craft capable of change, improvement, and progression—or even regression. It is also a craft and tool that can be acquired by all those who are willing to learn to wield it. Thus, agenda-setting and action are no longer in the hands of state actors, Kelley argues.
He fails to make note, however, that agenda-setting and actions never were entirely in the hands of state actors. Thus, it’s not that the gaping chasm of unequal influence of nation-states and non-state agents has healed itself, it’s just that as ICTs continued to develop and accessibility to these technologies begun spread in the 21st century, technological diffusion takes place. The quill pen gives way to the wing of an electronic Tweet. More people have access, and access helps to empower, and empowerment certainly sways influence, however, this phenomenon does not replace the functions of diplomacy as an institution.
Instead, Kelley’s brand of “new diplomacy” is not a new mode of behavior; it is an improved means of communication, networking, and negotiating in the globalized dynamics of our modern world.
Critical to note is Kelley’s point about populations and their identification with transnational concerns. In our globalized world, political, economic, and social concerns are no longer local, but international—and in being international, they transcend traditional boundaries set forth by the nation-state. As a result, the global public is increasingly likely to “‘relocate’ authority to a non-state entity or figure, which in turn enables the non-state actor to amass moral legitimacy and to influence the behavior of states from the outside” (289). Kelley calls these non-state actors the “new diplomats.”
While they do maneuver “within the state system and command authority across it,” these non-state actors highlighted in the article are not diplomats in the traditional sense, period. They are also not the “new diplomats,” as Kelley is fond of labeling them. Calling these non-state actors ‘diplomats’ is a misnomer. Instead, these non-state actors are tremendous networks of influence—but they are not diplomats. They are polymaths, masters of their technological savvy, and well-connected free agents eager to secure their own agenda through diplomatic behavior and engagement. In the 21st century they continue to engage in diplomacy just as they always have, except now they are armed and more deeply embedded in the minds and hearts of the public through their activity with social media and ICTs.
In repeatedly highlighting the demise of diplomacy as an institution and its proliferation as a behavior, Kelley reveals his epiphany while seemingly ignoring how throughout history, non-state actors—such as corporate actors—have always had a hand (or a fist) in negotiating (and racketing) policy in international affairs. The institution of diplomacy is open to progression, improvements, and technological diffusion. Non-state actors have gained greater primacy and strength in their ability to positively contribute to their public diplomacy of choice, but they have not replaced their official counterparts. Diplomats continue to function as official representatives of their states abroad, constrained always by protocol, but distinguished by their responsibility to serve and their ability to discern and navigate the delicate negotiations that must take place at the decentralized table of modern diplomacy.
Thursday, May 17, 2012
Propaganda or Public Diplomacy? An Analysis of Critical Factors
In the realm of public diplomacy, the battle over foreign hearts and minds can all too often seem akin to the familiar tactics of the advertising and marketing agencies that inundate American culture. There are advocates of traditional diplomacy that warn the practices of public diplomacy and the “new public diplomacy” fall too heavily on the side of propaganda, which has a much more contentious connotation.
However, when juxtaposing Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda, a piece by Jay Black, with the public diplomacy contributions of Melissen, Gilboa, and Cull, the fine lines that separate the two fields become a bit clearer. Black articulates historical conceptions of propaganda, noting that it has always been associated with negative aspects of power. This is now extended to the process of introducing ideas and information to a group with the intent to have them react the same way both psychologically and in their actions. It is here that propaganda may be confused with public diplomacy, where information and ideas are being introduced to foreign publics with the intent to ultimately provide a favorable view of the of the state.
To combat this perception, there are a few clear differences to note. First, in propaganda the style of communication tends to be one-way from a sender to a receiver. Public diplomacy directly contradicts this notion, as the method by which publics are being engaged is via two-way communications, most notably by emerging and participatory media or information communication technologies. Melissen, a proponent of this concept, noted that a major tenet of public diplomacy is how this builds a relationship between two states where there is mutual gain. Cull compounds this notion by listing ‘Listening’ as the most crucial concept of public diplomacy in the UK. In light of this, we can draw yet another difference: propaganda focuses on identifying conflicts or competition on its audience while public diplomacy strives for cooperation and exchange.
Intention of the message is also a topic of discussion. In propaganda, there is often a clearly defined and easily identifiable goal of the communication, and this goal can be moral or immoral with whatever values laden within it. Public diplomacy also must have a clearly communicated intent or goal, but goals are often not easily attained or identifiable, as international relations is a complex and muddled field that is affected by many other influences such as economic or political conditions. Moreover, Gilboa stated that these conditions are never fixed, as they can be in propaganda.
This leads to the next point, which is the conception of time between the two. Black asserted that propaganda is solely concerned on the implementation of information and persuasion in an immediate or short time frame, while public diplomacy is assumed to be focused on multiple time frames, with short, medium and long term goals in mind.
Despite all of these observed differences, I believe there is a process of unification with the recent developments in communication technology. As was stated, the realms of public diplomacy and public relations are melding, as attractiveness and reputation are becoming the new markers of power in the world. Both Melissen and Black each point out that public diplomacy and propaganda have undergone a critical change with the dawn of the information age in their own field, but I assert these should be thought of together. Propaganda and public diplomacy are now being both produced and consumed not only by states, but by a host of actors, including individuals themselves. It harkens Melissen’s polylateralism, where all entities now have the power to influence foreign publics. We can create our own ad or information campaigns and, depending upon the platform, time, and spread of the information, they can greatly affect international relations or conceptions. I believe this is happening to public relations/advertising and public diplomacy simultaneously, and I think it further complicates the ways in which the two can be separated – who is to say an ad campaign that positively affects a foreign public is not a form of public diplomacy or vice versa?
This will need further analysis as more cases come out, but I wanted to raise the initial question.
However, when juxtaposing Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda, a piece by Jay Black, with the public diplomacy contributions of Melissen, Gilboa, and Cull, the fine lines that separate the two fields become a bit clearer. Black articulates historical conceptions of propaganda, noting that it has always been associated with negative aspects of power. This is now extended to the process of introducing ideas and information to a group with the intent to have them react the same way both psychologically and in their actions. It is here that propaganda may be confused with public diplomacy, where information and ideas are being introduced to foreign publics with the intent to ultimately provide a favorable view of the of the state.
To combat this perception, there are a few clear differences to note. First, in propaganda the style of communication tends to be one-way from a sender to a receiver. Public diplomacy directly contradicts this notion, as the method by which publics are being engaged is via two-way communications, most notably by emerging and participatory media or information communication technologies. Melissen, a proponent of this concept, noted that a major tenet of public diplomacy is how this builds a relationship between two states where there is mutual gain. Cull compounds this notion by listing ‘Listening’ as the most crucial concept of public diplomacy in the UK. In light of this, we can draw yet another difference: propaganda focuses on identifying conflicts or competition on its audience while public diplomacy strives for cooperation and exchange.
Intention of the message is also a topic of discussion. In propaganda, there is often a clearly defined and easily identifiable goal of the communication, and this goal can be moral or immoral with whatever values laden within it. Public diplomacy also must have a clearly communicated intent or goal, but goals are often not easily attained or identifiable, as international relations is a complex and muddled field that is affected by many other influences such as economic or political conditions. Moreover, Gilboa stated that these conditions are never fixed, as they can be in propaganda.
This leads to the next point, which is the conception of time between the two. Black asserted that propaganda is solely concerned on the implementation of information and persuasion in an immediate or short time frame, while public diplomacy is assumed to be focused on multiple time frames, with short, medium and long term goals in mind.
Despite all of these observed differences, I believe there is a process of unification with the recent developments in communication technology. As was stated, the realms of public diplomacy and public relations are melding, as attractiveness and reputation are becoming the new markers of power in the world. Both Melissen and Black each point out that public diplomacy and propaganda have undergone a critical change with the dawn of the information age in their own field, but I assert these should be thought of together. Propaganda and public diplomacy are now being both produced and consumed not only by states, but by a host of actors, including individuals themselves. It harkens Melissen’s polylateralism, where all entities now have the power to influence foreign publics. We can create our own ad or information campaigns and, depending upon the platform, time, and spread of the information, they can greatly affect international relations or conceptions. I believe this is happening to public relations/advertising and public diplomacy simultaneously, and I think it further complicates the ways in which the two can be separated – who is to say an ad campaign that positively affects a foreign public is not a form of public diplomacy or vice versa?
This will need further analysis as more cases come out, but I wanted to raise the initial question.
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