Showing posts with label communication. Show all posts
Showing posts with label communication. Show all posts

Thursday, June 21, 2012

Defining Nation Branding in Middle Power Public Diplomacy


Geopolitics have consistently evolved since the Cold War, and have given rise to a large number of nations which ascribe to a status referred to as a ‘Middle Power’. These nations, South Africa, South Korea, Canada and Australia among them, have attained a level of stability, ingenuity or leadership in a certain domestic sectors, which enable them to compete with superpowers such as the United States and China. However, these nations are still dealing with internal or international development in other facets.


One way in which middle powers can attempt to assert themselves against conceptions of inferiority is nation branding, or the process of acutely strategizing information, products and practices that positively affect how other countries view them. These branding strategies are oftentimes synonymous with other diplomatic or public diplomacy efforts.


In my opinion, nation branding retains the ability to be classified as or synonymous with public diplomacy only if it meets certain conditions. If the intention behind the nation brand is to advance a state’s foreign policy agenda (whether that be through multilateral partnerships, soft power strategies, economic ties, etc.) then I believe it should be considered an arm of public diplomacy, as it does assist in the control over image, message and attractiveness of a state.  Ideally, the nation brand reflects an accurate depiction of the country. When this image is not depicted correctly, there can be disagreements from such parties as the foreign public, the international media or the domestic public.  This is exemplified in the Brand Kenya campaign, where Kenyan nationals are shown to not have a high level of patriotism due to internal conditions like importation, violence and corruption.


What I do not believe is public diplomacy is when a national branding strategy is created for purely commercial purposes. Within this context, nation branding is more closely related to propaganda or advertising, as there is not always the guarantee of legitimacy or credibility behind the image or message and there may not be ample space for dialogue within the strategy. Association is also a factor. Brand Kenya, although a legitimate nation brand, was crafted by PR firm Interbrand Sampson, which also has commercial products such as AT&T and Wrigley in their repertoire. Eytan Gilboa reflected on this when he noted that nation brands must be prepared to be very flexible with their product, as public diplomacy is a fluid process.


I think it is also crucial to consider intention of nation branding strategies that do not have foreign policy goals besides increasing international recognition and attractiveness. Popularity in the international arena is not public diplomacy because it should not be an end in itself, but rather a means to an end of specific foreign policy objectives.


It may be easy for a ‘middle power’ to consider their nation branding strategy a form of public diplomacy, despite the fact there are purely commercial entities conducting it. As is also described by Gilboa, middle powers are characteristically strapped for resources in public diplomacy, yet must constantly strive to remain sustainable and influential within their sector, lest succumb to the fluidity of the geopolitical sphere.  

My response to "The Limits of Country Branding"



"The Limits of Country Branding"

My response to classmate Alejandro Neyra's post found by clicking here.

The Boston Globe makes note of the nation-building as a trend, reporting on how “the last few years have seen an explosion of ‘nation-branding,’ shorthand for coordinated government efforts to manage a country's image, whether to improve tourism, investment, or even foreign relations” (Risen, 2005). As Alejandro points out, Mexico, South Korea, and other middle powers are no exception. These middle powers are invested in gaining soft power, 'top of mind awareness,' cultural leverage, and a means to foster mutually beneficial relationships with its own constituents, prospective investors, potential customers, and/or other countries. Cesar Villanueva Rivas highlights how some countries, such as Mexico, are compelled to remake its image in effort to dispel the negative press that has plagued the country since it experienced a surge in "narco-violence." Other developing middle powers, such as South Korea, are trying to polish their public image to foster their influence. This is illustrated in Sook-Jung Lee's briefing on "South Korea's Soft Power Diplomacy," where he underscores how "South Korea’s national image and values for [the brand concept of a] Global Korea should be prosperous, democratic, modest, nonthreatening, and culturally syncretic, since many Third World countries see South Korea as a model with its simultaneous achievement of development and democratization” (Lee, 2009). One tactic indispensable to South Korea's branding strategy relies on translating its commercial and private sector success--Samsung's or LG's brand power for example--into soft power. The other tactic that is critical to South Korea's branding strategy is that it must follow through with the realization that branding, to put it in Alejandro's words, "is not only about having a commercial logo or a catchy slogan," but about building trust and fostering a credible rapport with the public.

This tactic goes beyond branding and moves into the realm of public diplomacy, which not only promotes the understanding of a nation's brand, but also the understanding of its culture, heritage, and people. In a sense, governments seeking to create their own brands and grow brand value also want to “develop [an] emotional, positive reaction between their part of the world and citizens...[they] want to make or re-make their image in the world to gain clout vis-à-vis their neighbors to achieve certain political ends” (Youde, 2009). In order to pique and develop the public's empathy for and/or sense of connection to a brand, a nation must look to its public diplomacy programming. As Alejandro also notes, public diplomacy is intrinsic to branding—and not secondary to it—because it provides various groups with the possibility to interact with, learn from, and connect to others. In other words, branding alone has its limits, but when combined with public diplomacy and people-to-people initiatives, the two have the power to building bridge across cultures, fostering mutual understanding within a larger regional or global community.

Just as branding is indispensable to shaping and communicating brand value, so too is public diplomacy to “helping audiences identify with” nation-states and “encouraging them to buy its products and services” (van Ham, 2002). And just as Lee emphasizes how “the soft power of a country operates in constant interaction with its hard power,” so too does public diplomacy operate in tandem with nation-branding.

Wednesday, June 13, 2012

India should balance capacity and capability



In his article on “India’s Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations,” Christian Wagner examines India’s soft power in several contexts—the U.S.-dominated military context; our contemporary globalized context with empowered nation-states and non-state actors; and the ever important international economic context. By providing several categories for understanding “soft power capacities”—culture, political values, and foreign policy—Wagner highlights India’s immediate advantages in its public diplomacy practices. He does so by underscoring its strong democratic traditions in a post-colonial society, Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy of non-violent engagement and peaceful conflict resolution, its promotion of India as a global technology hub and investment destination, its storied engagement in multilateral diplomacy, and its increasingly popular Bollywood film industry.

He concludes that while positive perceptions of India’s social and political values assist in fostering its soft power, such perceptions are only a stamp of approval and not an acknowledgement of influence. In other words, although India has incredible brand power and potential, it currently lacks the star-appeal of other soft-power giants for a few reasons: (1) India’s values and practice of democracy are not perceived as models for the rest of the world; (2) India favors attracting foreign direct investment to its own land and is very slow in fostering its own political, social, and/or economic investment in other countries that could benefit from its leadership; and (3) Indian society is just beginning to comprehend its diversity and its identity.

While it is evident India boasts a number of strengths in effectively leveraging soft power to project its desired image of a tech-savvy and sexy investment destination, the regional hegemon is missing critical foreign policy considerations and long-term strategies in its public diplomacy vision and practice. These missing long-range considerations will give rise to foreign policy challenges that India will likely face down the road. One limitation to India’s soft power capacity is its emphasis on capacity over hard power capabilities. Moreover, its use and aims of soft power seem to stray from its menu of hard power.

Second, India is the world’s largest democracy—heir to the storied legacy of Gandhi—and yet it has been shockingly slow in seeking to promote its democratic ideals abroad and exert influence. Despite its strategic location bordering Burma (Myanmar), India failed to step forward to strongly support Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic minority and “missed the Burma bus”—allowing regional competitor China to seize influence instead. All this, despite India’s experience as a strong multilateral player.

Wagner highlights how India specifically uses its soft power—by way of its industry, economy, political and social values—to build up its image rather than to exert its influence on foreign policy. However, these factors are capacity-enablers, not capability promoters. As Wagner notes, a nation’s soft power capability allows it to effectively channel its capacities or resources into instruments or initiatives of foreign policy. As I previously emphasized, India could stand to improve a number of its soft power outlets. However, there is one soft power medium India’s public and private organizations could more easily restructure for everyone’s benefit—Bollywood. Wagner is ambiguous when he describes “Bollywood as a quasi-global dream fabric.” It is not clear what he means by this, but I imagine he is trying to describe Bollywood as a medium that delivers the Indian Dream—the endless opportunities for freedom, innovation, romance, and prosperity found in India. As Wagner notes, Bollywood films compared to “Hollywood…do not reflect or promote a universal model for political or cultural development and should therefore be seen as mere entertainment.” While Bollywood films depict the energy and drama of different classes of Indian society and daily life in a glamorized fashion, its soft power influence seemingly pales in comparison to South Korea’s popular K-Dramas.

South Korean dramas have had an extraordinary influence in shaping the country’s national image around the world—even in North Korea, where South Korean materials are verboten but immensely popular. One North Korean defector told the New York Times how influential the K-Dramas were in shaping her perception of the world outside Pyongyang. Popular Korean dramas often feature the newest technologies on their sets—brand new kitchens, electronic accessories in bathrooms—and the characters in most shows often showcase the most luxurious accessories. Although they are just TV dramas, these South Korean productions have ignited a wave of South Korean popularity throughout Asia and Latin America. And while a TV show may just be a fragment of reality, its soft power capital has the potential to change lives, as evidenced by Ahn Mi Ock’s defector story. If India can mimic and invest in a balance between capacity and capability, it will stand to benefit in the long-term.

Thursday, May 24, 2012

Social Media & Communication Flows of Public Diplomacy

Despite assumptions regarding social media as a space meant for the proliferation of pointless quips and equally pointless content, the mere fact that civil society now has the ability to interact on these platforms without the control or approval of the state provides an entirely subversive aspect to state-controlled public diplomacy, an area of both national and international importance.

As author Peter Van Ham notes in Social Power in International Politics, the public diplomacy environment formerly mediated much at the hands of state actors is now being altered into a more multi-directional scene where the state, NGOs, international orgs, individuals and other actors can produce and consume information directly, thereby weakening state control. Often this process plays out in social media technologies where actors can take messages into their own hands.

However, the state should not be discounted in the social media realm. In fact, the state or other actors can take on a mediator role in all three typologies of public diplomacy, as outlined by Cowan and Arsenault in Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: Three Layers of Public Diplomacy. This is because the three typologies are based upon communication strategies that can be easily employed by any entity engaging with a foreign public. I’ll describe how each typology can engage publics with social media: 

Monological 

Although monological or one-way communication where one entity transmits a message to an audience may seem to contradict the very nature of social media it actually can be an effective way of engaging with foreign publics. Making the choice to participate in social media platforms does not automatically open up the way for dialogical or collaborative forms of public diplomacy. An actor can create an account on a social media platform such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr or Pinterest and solely utilize that platform to amass a following and promote information carefully crafted in tune with their particular interest.

Monological communication on social media is advantageous because actors can target audiences according to these particular interests and goals, gain heightened visibility fast and reach a wide swath of active users. Although there can be commentary or feedback given to the actor by its community, the actor has control over the choice to reciprocate or not.

The downside to monological communication is that the information promoted isn’t able to be contained within the confines of the group. Social media is meant to be shared and users can/will disseminate messages further to estranged groups that may not have the desired reaction. A way the actor can assuage a hostile reaction to their public diplomacy effort is to ensure prior to sending out the initial communication many various viewpoints and perspectives are considered. An actor can also provide carefully crafted responses back to users, but this would break the monologic aspect of the public diplomacy effort. 

Dialogical 

Dialogical public diplomacy works well with social media because of the necessity to create a conversation between the actor and audience. Social media features like commenting, re-tweeting, ‘liking’, instant messaging and texting can help actors gauge public opinion surrounding their perspective as well as the importance foreign publics weigh on certain topics. This could be a good method for an actor to get ideas flowing for a project or a way to foster intercultural exchange. Again, this is advantageous to actors because dialogical communications can be targeted to interested groups where the actor can initiate and steer the dialogue in certain directions.

The negative aspect of dialogical public diplomacy is that, again, the communications can be driven away from the control of the actor and may veer off in a separate direction than originally intended. There are also competing dialogical conversations that are started within many other contexts that may tangentially or directly influence or challenge the goals and perspectives of an actor.


Collaborative 

Certain types of social media outlets are uniquely appropriate for collaborative public diplomacy. Because the goal in this effort is to produce a product from the contributions of many, open-source projects like the Linux operating system or the Drupal content management system are particularly relevant. In these, any users who are interested are encouraged to assist in the creation and maintenance of the product. The public diplomacy goal that results from collaboration is a sense of common ground and shared loyalty/experience to a goal by all members despite observed differences.

Easy ways to utilize collaborative public diplomacy is in working with wikis, file-sharing systems like Google Docs and mass-multiplayer role-playing games like Second Life or World of Warcraft. Each of these allow for users to personally take on responsibilities and contribute to the building or maintenance of a greater initiative. The potential downside to collaborative public diplomacy is that users must be involved from the ground floor or else they will not establish the necessary trust and social capital needed to foster the bond. Ensuring the collaborative project forces cross-cultural groups to view issues in a different light is particularly challenging, but if done correctly and assist in such areas as conflict resolution.

I think it is imperative to understand that social media is not a magic bullet for public diplomacy. Social media is the next innovation following other revolutionary technologies such as radio, television and the Internet. Although it has brought all actors in society closer together at an unprecedented rate, it is best to realize these capabilities are only as effective as the actors that use them. As Van Ham notes, technological progression must be met with human agency and the correct political economy to flourish.