New Resources, New Challenges for Indian Public Diplomacy

There is no such thing as a seamless public diplomacy strategy. Throughout our readings and research we have seen that in the process of projecting an attractive and legitimate image to a foreign public there has always been some internal or external factor that inhibits its full effect. In the case of China, the deterrent was its history of human rights abuses and stifled response to crises. In Taiwan, it was a lack of involvement on the international stage in multi-lateral relations and associations. In Japan, it was too much focus on spreading popular culture and not enough on promoting their foreign policy agenda.

Now we have India, the world's largest democracy, that is dealing with its own set of unique opportunities and pitfalls in public diplomacy. I will detail these as "resources" and "challenges".

Resources:

India has a very advanced IT sector, which puts it in a great position to use this as leverage for public diplomacy strategies. Examples of utilizing this strength come in the form of adaptation to e-diplomacy, e-governance, ICT4D and digital diplomacy via social networks or other means of transnational communication. The Ministry of External Affairs website exemplifies many of these characteristics as they reach out via Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, have enabled platforms for Indian diasporics to connect and publish content regularly.

Another resource is what is referred to as the "soft" aspect of their hard power. Politically, they are the world's largest democracy and a long-standing one at that. Although it hasn't been widely noticed on a global scale, it has had an affect on regional democracy building in places like Nepal and Pakistan. India is in a position to use their history to actively promote politically to some of the world's most sensitive areas like Iran and Syria, which aligns India closer in relations to the US.

Jumping off of that point, India still maintains its appeal to developing states. Because India is still in many ways developing itself, it can easily reach out and form relationships with Asian, Middle Eastern or African countries for purposes of mutual development. This has already been started with the Indiafrica project, seeking to build relations between African countries and India.

Challenges:

One glaring challenge for India is that it is late in the game of public diplomacy. Although their presence is definitely felt in, they only began implementing public diplomacy in 2006 and are still experimenting with how exactly to apply it in an Indian context that will encapsulate the state.

This presents another issue for India, diversity. Attempts to brand or project a unified India are extremely difficult due to a diverse and complex demographic, consisting of many ethnic groups, languages, religions, castes, political groups and economic statuses. This harkens some of the same troubles even the US has in nation-branding, as it houses an array of citizens and many times it is difficult to convey one image or culture to foreign publics.

As is the case with many states, there is confusion between the foreign and the domestic audience in public diplomacy. India seems to be targeting Indians for development purposes as well as foreign publics who they would like to be aware of what is happening in the state. However, the question then becomes whether their credibility is being compromised by doing this. Internal studies show that Indians do not feel their country is strong or powerful enough to have influence over other nations, which indicates that different narratives need to be employed for foreign and domestic audiences.

Finally, India has followed in the footsteps of Japan and South Korea by overtly projecting culture and tourism to foreign audiences rather than taking a stance on foreign policy or even integrating that stance into their cultural communications. The Incredible India campaign has been very popular and visitors to India have increased significantly, but is this public diplomacy or is this tourism? Can it be both? This goes along with their soft power approach, and it has had some success, but in continued efforts there should be some policy backing. Otherwise India will be liked but not seen as powerful or influential, which is the opposite intention of PD strategy.

In a quick summation, I would argue that India needs to engage its domestic audience in a nationalistic campaign, uniting them under one India and boosting self-image. This is a key starting point before public diplomacy will function for them. Then, once this is improved, India can begin engaging their citizenry or government with foreign publics using their advanced IT arena, not only promoting culture but backing that up with a democratic or developmental goal. This way, other nations will look to India for influence or aid when it comes to political or economic factors, thereby giving India a large foothold. The effect should be cyclical, as this increased attention will strengthen India's name and importance on a global scale while simultaneously improving self-image.

Taiwan: Shadow or Nation?

What are the challenges and opportunities for Taiwanese public diplomacy?

Paul Rockower outlines a number of suitable opportunities for Taiwan to seize as it continues to address the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China next door. He suggests that Taiwan embrace and advertise its cultural offerings—by assembling a traveling night market—as well as its strategic geopolitical location, democratic values, and economic strength.

With its robust economy and classification as a middle power, Taiwan’s political capital and opportunities rest largely on its promotion of a democratic model, allocation of foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and engagement in polylateral and track II methods of diplomacy as well as on its strategic location vis-à-vis U.S. interests in safeguarding its Pacific presence.

Opportunities for elevating Taiwanese soft power and influence abound: not only could Taiwan construct interactive outposts, online Taiwan Academies and promote gastrodiplomacy programs to represent its interests, heritage, and cultural importance as the true heir of Chinese culture—it could increase its soft power and influence through the expanding on the niches available. Taiwan would reap rewards for pivoting its terms of diplomatic engagement to focus on two key areas, international communication technologies (ICT) and urban housing and development design. Its expertise in these two indispensable topics would likely be universally appreciated.

Since 2007, Taiwan’s sphere of legitimate influence has steadily shrunk, however, despite the government’s efforts at checkbook diplomacy and aid engagement. For example, the government of Costa Rica, which recognized Taiwan as sovereign for over several decades, suddenly switched its allegiance to the PRC overnight—perhaps because it was attracted to Beijing’s offer to build the Costa Rican national stadium in San Jose. Today less than 25 countries officially recognize Taiwan.

Taiwan will continue to face the threat of an ever-expanding China whose enormous assets (i.e. ICT company Huawei Technologies) and mammoth influence will become increasingly difficult to compete with, given its size and scope. And although Taiwan’s aid program managed to broker diplomatic ties throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the same judgment cannot be made today. As R. Ellis highlights, global perception and reception of China is changing for a number of reasons. A growing number of developing countries especially are attracted to China because they bear “hopes for future access to Chinese markets and investment,” interest in China’s role as a possible “counterweight to the United States and Western institutions, and admire its successful economic development model.

As fewer and fewer countries recognize Taiwan and as it is forced to manufacture a “Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics” for public consumption, it is evident that Taiwan’s weight is not what it once was. Only time and strategy will tell whether Taiwan will be able to meet the difficulties posed by its neighbor.

Social Power vs. Soft Power in the Realm of Foreign Policy

Joseph Nye describes soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” As the world advances to a globalized community with greater access to communication tools, soft power has become a dominant force in every day life. However, is soft power the best term in foreign policy makers? In the sphere of foreign policy, social power can better categorize the actions and intentions of foreign policy makers.

Soft power focuses more on the diffusion of culture, political ideals, and policies, which can help promote a state’s international image, but in the realm of foreign policy, soft power is too passive. Social power on the other hand, which Van Ham describes as “the ability to set standards and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable without resorting to coercion or payment” is more suited to the realm of foreign policy making as it takes more of an active role.  Social power is more proactive as it advocates new standards, norms, and values, which is a large part of foreign policy making. Soft power is more “being “ than “doing”, and traditional foreign policy methods encourage direct behavior in achieving certain objectives.

Soft power has 3 key limitations that might deter foreign policy makers: the issue of time, control, and credibility. Soft power is a central aspect to foreign policy and public diplomacy efforts, but the effectiveness of soft power is difficult to measure and most often the effects seen after long periods of time. As Wilton indicates, soft power can be difficult for policy makers as  “it offers less scope than harder instruments to demonstrate achievements in foreign policy goals”. As is such, soft power results offer the long term do not serve well for the short-term elected officials who often demand short-term accomplished goals to promote to the public.

Once soft power has been unleashed, it is difficult to control it as the “success in terms of outcome is more in the control of the target than often the case with hard power” (Nye). The diffusion of a certain culture or government policy leaves the perception and opinion to the targeted audience. Whether it is received positively or negatively depends on the public. For foreign policy makers, the lack of control on the outcome of an initiative rooted in soft power is difficult to grasp.

In order for soft power to be effective, the perception of credibility/legitimacy by the public is paramount. If the people do not legitimately recognize a state often, its attempt of soft power is viewed as propaganda efforts to influence the public. The role of the government is to empower the citizens to create communication lines to increase the powers of attraction. Also, as soft power needs the cooperation of international players such as NGO’s, trans and supranational network, legitimacy first needs to be established.

Soft power can be an effective tool, but might not be the best term to adequately apply to the foreign policy realm. As social power supports a greater sense of advocacy and the establishment of international norms it is better suited. Van Ham’s assessment of social power in the international realm is very comprehensive but he lacks a clear distinction between soft power and social power. Soft power though a great tool for promoting ideas can also be very limiting to policy makers in the issue of time, control, and legitimacy.