India should balance capacity and capability

In his article on “India’s Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations,” Christian Wagner examines India’s soft power in several contexts—the U.S.-dominated military context; our contemporary globalized context with empowered nation-states and non-state actors; and the ever important international economic context. By providing several categories for understanding “soft power capacities”—culture, political values, and foreign policy—Wagner highlights India’s immediate advantages in its public diplomacy practices. He does so by underscoring its strong democratic traditions in a post-colonial society, Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy of non-violent engagement and peaceful conflict resolution, its promotion of India as a global technology hub and investment destination, its storied engagement in multilateral diplomacy, and its increasingly popular Bollywood film industry.

He concludes that while positive perceptions of India’s social and political values assist in fostering its soft power, such perceptions are only a stamp of approval and not an acknowledgement of influence. In other words, although India has incredible brand power and potential, it currently lacks the star-appeal of other soft-power giants for a few reasons: (1) India’s values and practice of democracy are not perceived as models for the rest of the world; (2) India favors attracting foreign direct investment to its own land and is very slow in fostering its own political, social, and/or economic investment in other countries that could benefit from its leadership; and (3) Indian society is just beginning to comprehend its diversity and its identity.

While it is evident India boasts a number of strengths in effectively leveraging soft power to project its desired image of a tech-savvy and sexy investment destination, the regional hegemon is missing critical foreign policy considerations and long-term strategies in its public diplomacy vision and practice. These missing long-range considerations will give rise to foreign policy challenges that India will likely face down the road. One limitation to India’s soft power capacity is its emphasis on capacity over hard power capabilities. Moreover, its use and aims of soft power seem to stray from its menu of hard power.

Second, India is the world’s largest democracy—heir to the storied legacy of Gandhi—and yet it has been shockingly slow in seeking to promote its democratic ideals abroad and exert influence. Despite its strategic location bordering Burma (Myanmar), India failed to step forward to strongly support Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic minority and “missed the Burma bus”—allowing regional competitor China to seize influence instead. All this, despite India’s experience as a strong multilateral player.

Wagner highlights how India specifically uses its soft power—by way of its industry, economy, political and social values—to build up its image rather than to exert its influence on foreign policy. However, these factors are capacity-enablers, not capability promoters. As Wagner notes, a nation’s soft power capability allows it to effectively channel its capacities or resources into instruments or initiatives of foreign policy. As I previously emphasized, India could stand to improve a number of its soft power outlets. However, there is one soft power medium India’s public and private organizations could more easily restructure for everyone’s benefit—Bollywood. Wagner is ambiguous when he describes “Bollywood as a quasi-global dream fabric.” It is not clear what he means by this, but I imagine he is trying to describe Bollywood as a medium that delivers the Indian Dream—the endless opportunities for freedom, innovation, romance, and prosperity found in India. As Wagner notes, Bollywood films compared to “Hollywood…do not reflect or promote a universal model for political or cultural development and should therefore be seen as mere entertainment.” While Bollywood films depict the energy and drama of different classes of Indian society and daily life in a glamorized fashion, its soft power influence seemingly pales in comparison to South Korea’s popular K-Dramas.

South Korean dramas have had an extraordinary influence in shaping the country’s national image around the world—even in North Korea, where South Korean materials are verboten but immensely popular. One North Korean defector told the New York Times how influential the K-Dramas were in shaping her perception of the world outside Pyongyang. Popular Korean dramas often feature the newest technologies on their sets—brand new kitchens, electronic accessories in bathrooms—and the characters in most shows often showcase the most luxurious accessories. Although they are just TV dramas, these South Korean productions have ignited a wave of South Korean popularity throughout Asia and Latin America. And while a TV show may just be a fragment of reality, its soft power capital has the potential to change lives, as evidenced by Ahn Mi Ock’s defector story. If India can mimic and invest in a balance between capacity and capability, it will stand to benefit in the long-term.

Taiwan: Shadow or Nation?

What are the challenges and opportunities for Taiwanese public diplomacy?

Paul Rockower outlines a number of suitable opportunities for Taiwan to seize as it continues to address the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China next door. He suggests that Taiwan embrace and advertise its cultural offerings—by assembling a traveling night market—as well as its strategic geopolitical location, democratic values, and economic strength.

With its robust economy and classification as a middle power, Taiwan’s political capital and opportunities rest largely on its promotion of a democratic model, allocation of foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and engagement in polylateral and track II methods of diplomacy as well as on its strategic location vis-à-vis U.S. interests in safeguarding its Pacific presence.

Opportunities for elevating Taiwanese soft power and influence abound: not only could Taiwan construct interactive outposts, online Taiwan Academies and promote gastrodiplomacy programs to represent its interests, heritage, and cultural importance as the true heir of Chinese culture—it could increase its soft power and influence through the expanding on the niches available. Taiwan would reap rewards for pivoting its terms of diplomatic engagement to focus on two key areas, international communication technologies (ICT) and urban housing and development design. Its expertise in these two indispensable topics would likely be universally appreciated.

Since 2007, Taiwan’s sphere of legitimate influence has steadily shrunk, however, despite the government’s efforts at checkbook diplomacy and aid engagement. For example, the government of Costa Rica, which recognized Taiwan as sovereign for over several decades, suddenly switched its allegiance to the PRC overnight—perhaps because it was attracted to Beijing’s offer to build the Costa Rican national stadium in San Jose. Today less than 25 countries officially recognize Taiwan.

Taiwan will continue to face the threat of an ever-expanding China whose enormous assets (i.e. ICT company Huawei Technologies) and mammoth influence will become increasingly difficult to compete with, given its size and scope. And although Taiwan’s aid program managed to broker diplomatic ties throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the same judgment cannot be made today. As R. Ellis highlights, global perception and reception of China is changing for a number of reasons. A growing number of developing countries especially are attracted to China because they bear “hopes for future access to Chinese markets and investment,” interest in China’s role as a possible “counterweight to the United States and Western institutions, and admire its successful economic development model.

As fewer and fewer countries recognize Taiwan and as it is forced to manufacture a “Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics” for public consumption, it is evident that Taiwan’s weight is not what it once was. Only time and strategy will tell whether Taiwan will be able to meet the difficulties posed by its neighbor.

Social Power vs. Soft Power in the Realm of Foreign Policy

Joseph Nye describes soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” As the world advances to a globalized community with greater access to communication tools, soft power has become a dominant force in every day life. However, is soft power the best term in foreign policy makers? In the sphere of foreign policy, social power can better categorize the actions and intentions of foreign policy makers.

Soft power focuses more on the diffusion of culture, political ideals, and policies, which can help promote a state’s international image, but in the realm of foreign policy, soft power is too passive. Social power on the other hand, which Van Ham describes as “the ability to set standards and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable without resorting to coercion or payment” is more suited to the realm of foreign policy making as it takes more of an active role.  Social power is more proactive as it advocates new standards, norms, and values, which is a large part of foreign policy making. Soft power is more “being “ than “doing”, and traditional foreign policy methods encourage direct behavior in achieving certain objectives.

Soft power has 3 key limitations that might deter foreign policy makers: the issue of time, control, and credibility. Soft power is a central aspect to foreign policy and public diplomacy efforts, but the effectiveness of soft power is difficult to measure and most often the effects seen after long periods of time. As Wilton indicates, soft power can be difficult for policy makers as  “it offers less scope than harder instruments to demonstrate achievements in foreign policy goals”. As is such, soft power results offer the long term do not serve well for the short-term elected officials who often demand short-term accomplished goals to promote to the public.

Once soft power has been unleashed, it is difficult to control it as the “success in terms of outcome is more in the control of the target than often the case with hard power” (Nye). The diffusion of a certain culture or government policy leaves the perception and opinion to the targeted audience. Whether it is received positively or negatively depends on the public. For foreign policy makers, the lack of control on the outcome of an initiative rooted in soft power is difficult to grasp.

In order for soft power to be effective, the perception of credibility/legitimacy by the public is paramount. If the people do not legitimately recognize a state often, its attempt of soft power is viewed as propaganda efforts to influence the public. The role of the government is to empower the citizens to create communication lines to increase the powers of attraction. Also, as soft power needs the cooperation of international players such as NGO’s, trans and supranational network, legitimacy first needs to be established.

Soft power can be an effective tool, but might not be the best term to adequately apply to the foreign policy realm. As social power supports a greater sense of advocacy and the establishment of international norms it is better suited. Van Ham’s assessment of social power in the international realm is very comprehensive but he lacks a clear distinction between soft power and social power. Soft power though a great tool for promoting ideas can also be very limiting to policy makers in the issue of time, control, and legitimacy.

Embracing Collaborative Power and Accountability

Following Slaughter and Fisher, can the idea of "Power Over" be reconciled with an ethic of "Power with?" Put another way, can public diplomacy practitioners truly embrace “collaborative power” and still be accountable?

In capitalizing on the use of social media tools in an ever-globalized and interconnected world, can public diplomacy practitioners truly embrace Ali Fisher’s “facilitative approach” and emphasis on the periphery as well as Anne-Marie Slaughter’s “collaborative power” and still be accountable?

As Gary Weaver keenly observed, “When people communicate, they send messages, not meanings” (“The Re-Entry Process,” 1987). The narratives constructed through the use of collaborative power often will take on a life and meaning of their own, resulting in offshoots organizations, visions, and narratives. While the merits of top-down relational power practices will continue to shine and suit certain contexts, as Fisher points out, other contexts may require practitioners to engage in “power with” foreign, third-party partners. In such a scenario these practitioners may stand to gain greater credibility in the eyes of their partners, but they are no longer solely responsible for the outcome that results from embracing collaborative power. Instead, they are part of a much larger phenomenon of collective engagement and empowerment, which shares collective narrative and accountability in influencing the images, meaning, and understanding of messages.

Fisher highlights how, in the practice of public diplomacy, there is a “division between those that seek to exert ‘power over’ a target audience and those that intend to engage or empower a community” (“Looking at the Man in the Mirror,” pg. 273). The former tendency is often associated an organization’s core or top-down approach of exercising influence, while the latter is often practiced on the margins or periphery of a network.

Fisher also points out that the difference between ‘power over’ versus ‘power with’ is rooted in a number of issues, namely: (1) The struggle to align an organization’s messages and actions (contradictions and discrepancies between the two threaten credibility); (2) the dynamics of “state-based author-audience power relationship” and influence of domestic constituents; (3) the pressure to home one’s public diplomacy focus on “self-centered language rather than genuine engagement” with foreign publics; (4) identifying power relationships—whether core or periphery—within a network; and (5) defining and measuring success.

In seeking to articulate the modern “phenomenon…[of] networked, horizontal…and sustained application of collective will and resources” in this age of Twitter and other powerful social media tools, Slaughter seeks to complement Joseph Nye’s theory of relational power by articulating a theory on “collaborative power” and distinguishing it as one categorical form of soft power (The Atlantic, November 30, 2011). As Slaughter points out in her article, Nye defines relational power as the “capacity” to take action and achieve desired outcomes in certain social situations. His argument features three facets of relational power—the ability to command change, control agendas, and shape preferences—all facilitated through a top-down approach.

In contrast, collaborative power emphasizes the strength of open-sourced networking and the influence of “community organization” and empowerment. In Slaughter’s words, “collaborative power” is defined as “the power of many to do together what no one can do alone.” Collaborative power, or the power-with approach has the power to effect positive change through mutually beneficial partnerships--one case illustrating this is developing relationship between the United States and Myanmar's burgeoning democracy. Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton's admiration of, direct engagement, and partnership with democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has certainly empowered and quickened the process of democratization in the Southeast Asian country. With Western support and co-coordination, the Burmese were able to successfully hold parliamentary elections earlier this year.

Fisher and Slaughter make several interesting observations. One key observation is a reminder of how long ago, Karl Deutsch underscored the importance and significance of “community” (288). Sophisticated yet informal community organizing and use of “collaborative power” when well-placed has the potential to achieve tremendous outcomes. We see this when Anne-Marie Slaughter buttresses her argument with the example of Andrew Carvin’s #FreeMona hashtag, which trended worldwide on Twitter soon after its creation and helped to publicize and track the activist’s story—all while likely influencing global perception of the horrors of Mubarak’s administration. A second observation Fisher shares is the need to oscillate between the core-centric approach of the old-fashioned hub-and-spokes style of public diplomacy (and control of information exchange) and the newer peripheral practice or “facilitative approach of niche diplomacy where the benefit comes from helping others to achieve their goals” (281). Finally, he emphasizes the importance in recognizing the “importance and influence” of those on the periphery of communication networks (288). While both the “core and the periphery have vital roles,” it is evident that those who are marginalized, beyond the pale, or in the periphery are likely to first adopt an innovation and become “boundary spanners.”

In other words, the periphery is open soil in what Fisher identifies as the rich “inflow and outflow of knowledge and innovation” can take root and flourish. Throughout history, marginalized individuals have succeeded in gaining ground through collaborative networks of power and community organizing—to use post-colonial examples, Frantz Fanon, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. were all those once located on the periphery, beyond the pale.

To ensure their credibility in their embrace of collaborative power, public diplomacy practitioners must look to foster what Fisher terms as genuine dialogue, for which there must be “an element in which both sides are prepared to shift their position” (278). The key to influencing hearts and minds, it seems, lies in empowering publics to be open to change and/or new understandings of identity. In an ideal world, public diplomacy practitioners, boundary spanners, and partners alike would all gladly be held accountable for opening channels of exchange.

Propaganda or Public Diplomacy? An Analysis of Critical Factors

In the realm of public diplomacy, the battle over foreign hearts and minds can all too often seem akin to the familiar tactics of the advertising and marketing agencies that inundate American culture. There are advocates of traditional diplomacy that warn the practices of public diplomacy and the “new public diplomacy” fall too heavily on the side of propaganda, which has a much more contentious connotation.

However, when juxtaposing Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda, a piece by Jay Black, with the public diplomacy contributions of Melissen, Gilboa, and Cull, the fine lines that separate the two fields become a bit clearer. Black articulates historical conceptions of propaganda, noting that it has always been associated with negative aspects of power. This is now extended to the process of introducing ideas and information to a group with the intent to have them react the same way both psychologically and in their actions. It is here that propaganda may be confused with public diplomacy, where information and ideas are being introduced to foreign publics with the intent to ultimately provide a favorable view of the of the state.

To combat this perception, there are a few clear differences to note. First, in propaganda the style of communication tends to be one-way from a sender to a receiver. Public diplomacy directly contradicts this notion, as the method by which publics are being engaged is via two-way communications, most notably by emerging and participatory media or information communication technologies. Melissen, a proponent of this concept, noted that a major tenet of public diplomacy is how this builds a relationship between two states where there is mutual gain. Cull compounds this notion by listing ‘Listening’ as the most crucial concept of public diplomacy in the UK. In light of this, we can draw yet another difference: propaganda focuses on identifying conflicts or competition on its audience while public diplomacy strives for cooperation and exchange.

Intention of the message is also a topic of discussion. In propaganda, there is often a clearly defined and easily identifiable goal of the communication, and this goal can be moral or immoral with whatever values laden within it. Public diplomacy also must have a clearly communicated intent or goal, but goals are often not easily attained or identifiable, as international relations is a complex and muddled field that is affected by many other influences such as economic or political conditions. Moreover, Gilboa stated that these conditions are never fixed, as they can be in propaganda.

This leads to the next point, which is the conception of time between the two. Black asserted that propaganda is solely concerned on the implementation of information and persuasion in an immediate or short time frame, while public diplomacy is assumed to be focused on multiple time frames, with short, medium and long term goals in mind.

Despite all of these observed differences, I believe there is a process of unification with the recent developments in communication technology. As was stated, the realms of public diplomacy and public relations are melding, as attractiveness and reputation are becoming the new markers of power in the world. Both Melissen and Black each point out that public diplomacy and propaganda have undergone a critical change with the dawn of the information age in their own field, but I assert these should be thought of together. Propaganda and public diplomacy are now being both produced and consumed not only by states, but by a host of actors, including individuals themselves. It harkens Melissen’s polylateralism, where all entities now have the power to influence foreign publics. We can create our own ad or information campaigns and, depending upon the platform, time, and spread of the information, they can greatly affect international relations or conceptions. I believe this is happening to public relations/advertising and public diplomacy simultaneously, and I think it further complicates the ways in which the two can be separated – who is to say an ad campaign that positively affects a foreign public is not a form of public diplomacy or vice versa?

This will need further analysis as more cases come out, but I wanted to raise the initial question.