New Resources, New Challenges for Indian Public Diplomacy

There is no such thing as a seamless public diplomacy strategy. Throughout our readings and research we have seen that in the process of projecting an attractive and legitimate image to a foreign public there has always been some internal or external factor that inhibits its full effect. In the case of China, the deterrent was its history of human rights abuses and stifled response to crises. In Taiwan, it was a lack of involvement on the international stage in multi-lateral relations and associations. In Japan, it was too much focus on spreading popular culture and not enough on promoting their foreign policy agenda.

Now we have India, the world's largest democracy, that is dealing with its own set of unique opportunities and pitfalls in public diplomacy. I will detail these as "resources" and "challenges".

Resources:

India has a very advanced IT sector, which puts it in a great position to use this as leverage for public diplomacy strategies. Examples of utilizing this strength come in the form of adaptation to e-diplomacy, e-governance, ICT4D and digital diplomacy via social networks or other means of transnational communication. The Ministry of External Affairs website exemplifies many of these characteristics as they reach out via Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, have enabled platforms for Indian diasporics to connect and publish content regularly.

Another resource is what is referred to as the "soft" aspect of their hard power. Politically, they are the world's largest democracy and a long-standing one at that. Although it hasn't been widely noticed on a global scale, it has had an affect on regional democracy building in places like Nepal and Pakistan. India is in a position to use their history to actively promote politically to some of the world's most sensitive areas like Iran and Syria, which aligns India closer in relations to the US.

Jumping off of that point, India still maintains its appeal to developing states. Because India is still in many ways developing itself, it can easily reach out and form relationships with Asian, Middle Eastern or African countries for purposes of mutual development. This has already been started with the Indiafrica project, seeking to build relations between African countries and India.

Challenges:

One glaring challenge for India is that it is late in the game of public diplomacy. Although their presence is definitely felt in, they only began implementing public diplomacy in 2006 and are still experimenting with how exactly to apply it in an Indian context that will encapsulate the state.

This presents another issue for India, diversity. Attempts to brand or project a unified India are extremely difficult due to a diverse and complex demographic, consisting of many ethnic groups, languages, religions, castes, political groups and economic statuses. This harkens some of the same troubles even the US has in nation-branding, as it houses an array of citizens and many times it is difficult to convey one image or culture to foreign publics.

As is the case with many states, there is confusion between the foreign and the domestic audience in public diplomacy. India seems to be targeting Indians for development purposes as well as foreign publics who they would like to be aware of what is happening in the state. However, the question then becomes whether their credibility is being compromised by doing this. Internal studies show that Indians do not feel their country is strong or powerful enough to have influence over other nations, which indicates that different narratives need to be employed for foreign and domestic audiences.

Finally, India has followed in the footsteps of Japan and South Korea by overtly projecting culture and tourism to foreign audiences rather than taking a stance on foreign policy or even integrating that stance into their cultural communications. The Incredible India campaign has been very popular and visitors to India have increased significantly, but is this public diplomacy or is this tourism? Can it be both? This goes along with their soft power approach, and it has had some success, but in continued efforts there should be some policy backing. Otherwise India will be liked but not seen as powerful or influential, which is the opposite intention of PD strategy.

In a quick summation, I would argue that India needs to engage its domestic audience in a nationalistic campaign, uniting them under one India and boosting self-image. This is a key starting point before public diplomacy will function for them. Then, once this is improved, India can begin engaging their citizenry or government with foreign publics using their advanced IT arena, not only promoting culture but backing that up with a democratic or developmental goal. This way, other nations will look to India for influence or aid when it comes to political or economic factors, thereby giving India a large foothold. The effect should be cyclical, as this increased attention will strengthen India's name and importance on a global scale while simultaneously improving self-image.

India should balance capacity and capability

In his article on “India’s Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations,” Christian Wagner examines India’s soft power in several contexts—the U.S.-dominated military context; our contemporary globalized context with empowered nation-states and non-state actors; and the ever important international economic context. By providing several categories for understanding “soft power capacities”—culture, political values, and foreign policy—Wagner highlights India’s immediate advantages in its public diplomacy practices. He does so by underscoring its strong democratic traditions in a post-colonial society, Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy of non-violent engagement and peaceful conflict resolution, its promotion of India as a global technology hub and investment destination, its storied engagement in multilateral diplomacy, and its increasingly popular Bollywood film industry.

He concludes that while positive perceptions of India’s social and political values assist in fostering its soft power, such perceptions are only a stamp of approval and not an acknowledgement of influence. In other words, although India has incredible brand power and potential, it currently lacks the star-appeal of other soft-power giants for a few reasons: (1) India’s values and practice of democracy are not perceived as models for the rest of the world; (2) India favors attracting foreign direct investment to its own land and is very slow in fostering its own political, social, and/or economic investment in other countries that could benefit from its leadership; and (3) Indian society is just beginning to comprehend its diversity and its identity.

While it is evident India boasts a number of strengths in effectively leveraging soft power to project its desired image of a tech-savvy and sexy investment destination, the regional hegemon is missing critical foreign policy considerations and long-term strategies in its public diplomacy vision and practice. These missing long-range considerations will give rise to foreign policy challenges that India will likely face down the road. One limitation to India’s soft power capacity is its emphasis on capacity over hard power capabilities. Moreover, its use and aims of soft power seem to stray from its menu of hard power.

Second, India is the world’s largest democracy—heir to the storied legacy of Gandhi—and yet it has been shockingly slow in seeking to promote its democratic ideals abroad and exert influence. Despite its strategic location bordering Burma (Myanmar), India failed to step forward to strongly support Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic minority and “missed the Burma bus”—allowing regional competitor China to seize influence instead. All this, despite India’s experience as a strong multilateral player.

Wagner highlights how India specifically uses its soft power—by way of its industry, economy, political and social values—to build up its image rather than to exert its influence on foreign policy. However, these factors are capacity-enablers, not capability promoters. As Wagner notes, a nation’s soft power capability allows it to effectively channel its capacities or resources into instruments or initiatives of foreign policy. As I previously emphasized, India could stand to improve a number of its soft power outlets. However, there is one soft power medium India’s public and private organizations could more easily restructure for everyone’s benefit—Bollywood. Wagner is ambiguous when he describes “Bollywood as a quasi-global dream fabric.” It is not clear what he means by this, but I imagine he is trying to describe Bollywood as a medium that delivers the Indian Dream—the endless opportunities for freedom, innovation, romance, and prosperity found in India. As Wagner notes, Bollywood films compared to “Hollywood…do not reflect or promote a universal model for political or cultural development and should therefore be seen as mere entertainment.” While Bollywood films depict the energy and drama of different classes of Indian society and daily life in a glamorized fashion, its soft power influence seemingly pales in comparison to South Korea’s popular K-Dramas.

South Korean dramas have had an extraordinary influence in shaping the country’s national image around the world—even in North Korea, where South Korean materials are verboten but immensely popular. One North Korean defector told the New York Times how influential the K-Dramas were in shaping her perception of the world outside Pyongyang. Popular Korean dramas often feature the newest technologies on their sets—brand new kitchens, electronic accessories in bathrooms—and the characters in most shows often showcase the most luxurious accessories. Although they are just TV dramas, these South Korean productions have ignited a wave of South Korean popularity throughout Asia and Latin America. And while a TV show may just be a fragment of reality, its soft power capital has the potential to change lives, as evidenced by Ahn Mi Ock’s defector story. If India can mimic and invest in a balance between capacity and capability, it will stand to benefit in the long-term.