Defining Nation Branding in Middle Power Public Diplomacy

Geopolitics have consistently evolved since the Cold War, and have given rise to a large number of nations which ascribe to a status referred to as a ‘Middle Power’. These nations, South Africa, South Korea, Canada and Australia among them, have attained a level of stability, ingenuity or leadership in a certain domestic sectors, which enable them to compete with superpowers such as the United States and China. However, these nations are still dealing with internal or international development in other facets.


One way in which middle powers can attempt to assert themselves against conceptions of inferiority is nation branding, or the process of acutely strategizing information, products and practices that positively affect how other countries view them. These branding strategies are oftentimes synonymous with other diplomatic or public diplomacy efforts.


In my opinion, nation branding retains the ability to be classified as or synonymous with public diplomacy only if it meets certain conditions. If the intention behind the nation brand is to advance a state’s foreign policy agenda (whether that be through multilateral partnerships, soft power strategies, economic ties, etc.) then I believe it should be considered an arm of public diplomacy, as it does assist in the control over image, message and attractiveness of a state.  Ideally, the nation brand reflects an accurate depiction of the country. When this image is not depicted correctly, there can be disagreements from such parties as the foreign public, the international media or the domestic public.  This is exemplified in the Brand Kenya campaign, where Kenyan nationals are shown to not have a high level of patriotism due to internal conditions like importation, violence and corruption.


What I do not believe is public diplomacy is when a national branding strategy is created for purely commercial purposes. Within this context, nation branding is more closely related to propaganda or advertising, as there is not always the guarantee of legitimacy or credibility behind the image or message and there may not be ample space for dialogue within the strategy. Association is also a factor. Brand Kenya, although a legitimate nation brand, was crafted by PR firm Interbrand Sampson, which also has commercial products such as AT&T and Wrigley in their repertoire. Eytan Gilboa reflected on this when he noted that nation brands must be prepared to be very flexible with their product, as public diplomacy is a fluid process.


I think it is also crucial to consider intention of nation branding strategies that do not have foreign policy goals besides increasing international recognition and attractiveness. Popularity in the international arena is not public diplomacy because it should not be an end in itself, but rather a means to an end of specific foreign policy objectives.


It may be easy for a ‘middle power’ to consider their nation branding strategy a form of public diplomacy, despite the fact there are purely commercial entities conducting it. As is also described by Gilboa, middle powers are characteristically strapped for resources in public diplomacy, yet must constantly strive to remain sustainable and influential within their sector, lest succumb to the fluidity of the geopolitical sphere.  

What do you mean when you say this picture is propagandistic?

How does Black's extensive exploration of propaganda help us understand its distinction - if any - from public diplomacy?

In the post-Cold War era, the word ‘propaganda’ still casts a long, dark shadow in the English language. As Black highlights in his article, “Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda,” the term often brings to mind a practice that is sinister and unethical, despite its origins as a moral duty in the Roman Catholic Church. Propaganda—as it is understood in the aftermath of the Cold War—is seemingly inseparable from “manipulation and control, if not outright coercion,” and an unfair “power imbalance…between propagandists and propagandees” (121).

By exploring “how people perceive the world and how they subsequently communicate their perceptions or misperceptions,” Black’s analysis identifies more commonalities than differences between propaganda and public diplomacy (130). Black’s exploration of propaganda underscores how difficult it is to disentangle the two terms, since both practices are nuanced, varied, and dependent on individual orientations and belief systems.

In considering whether or not public diplomacy is distinct from propaganda, I conclude that it depends on the number of the aforementioned factors. The most primary factors are: (1) The intention of the information communicator(s) and (2) The belief systems of information receiver(s). How does the information communicator package information? Do they attempt to package it in a non-propagandistic manner? In turn, how do information receivers seek and process their information? Do they seek varied sources of information (as Rokeach’s open-minded individual would) and question what they learn? Or do they seek a monochromatic source of information and accept what they learn without question?

Ultimately, in U.S. democratic society, public diplomacy programs—be they U.S. or foreign—are recognizable competitors and contributors to the pluralist marketplace of ideas. They embody forms of “propagandas that challenge all of us—producers and consumers—to wisely sift and sort through them” (135). This is not likely the case in a closed society, such as Iran or North Korea. Therefore, the term ‘propaganda’ has a wide spectrum of nuanced significance, striking positive, negative, and all connotations between.

While Black concludes that propaganda is characterized by at least six specific characteristics, I believe whether or not public diplomacy fits the definition of propaganda depends entirely on how an individual, organization, or country elects to execute its public diplomacy program. If a public diplomacy program does possess all of the six characteristics, then it certainly seems heavily propagandistic. However, if a public diplomacy program such as the U.S. Embassy of Vietnam’s public diplomacy program—which elects to not emphasize the catastrophes of the Vietnam War—upholds a “time perspective characterized by an overemphasis or under-emphasis on the past, present, or future as disconnected periods rather than a demonstrated consciousness of time flow”—is it not also a bit propagandistic?

Perhaps, as Black suggests, an overemphasis or underemphasis on history may be intentional. It may also be unconscious, rooted in a certain view of the world, particular belief systems, “their personal and institutional loyalties, and their semantic behaviors” which may have propagandistic tendencies (135). Propaganda and public diplomacy cannot be understood in binary terms. Instead, they are very much nuanced, varied, and dependent on the orientations and tendencies of information senders and receivers in each unique communication exchange.

Propaganda or Public Diplomacy? An Analysis of Critical Factors

In the realm of public diplomacy, the battle over foreign hearts and minds can all too often seem akin to the familiar tactics of the advertising and marketing agencies that inundate American culture. There are advocates of traditional diplomacy that warn the practices of public diplomacy and the “new public diplomacy” fall too heavily on the side of propaganda, which has a much more contentious connotation.

However, when juxtaposing Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda, a piece by Jay Black, with the public diplomacy contributions of Melissen, Gilboa, and Cull, the fine lines that separate the two fields become a bit clearer. Black articulates historical conceptions of propaganda, noting that it has always been associated with negative aspects of power. This is now extended to the process of introducing ideas and information to a group with the intent to have them react the same way both psychologically and in their actions. It is here that propaganda may be confused with public diplomacy, where information and ideas are being introduced to foreign publics with the intent to ultimately provide a favorable view of the of the state.

To combat this perception, there are a few clear differences to note. First, in propaganda the style of communication tends to be one-way from a sender to a receiver. Public diplomacy directly contradicts this notion, as the method by which publics are being engaged is via two-way communications, most notably by emerging and participatory media or information communication technologies. Melissen, a proponent of this concept, noted that a major tenet of public diplomacy is how this builds a relationship between two states where there is mutual gain. Cull compounds this notion by listing ‘Listening’ as the most crucial concept of public diplomacy in the UK. In light of this, we can draw yet another difference: propaganda focuses on identifying conflicts or competition on its audience while public diplomacy strives for cooperation and exchange.

Intention of the message is also a topic of discussion. In propaganda, there is often a clearly defined and easily identifiable goal of the communication, and this goal can be moral or immoral with whatever values laden within it. Public diplomacy also must have a clearly communicated intent or goal, but goals are often not easily attained or identifiable, as international relations is a complex and muddled field that is affected by many other influences such as economic or political conditions. Moreover, Gilboa stated that these conditions are never fixed, as they can be in propaganda.

This leads to the next point, which is the conception of time between the two. Black asserted that propaganda is solely concerned on the implementation of information and persuasion in an immediate or short time frame, while public diplomacy is assumed to be focused on multiple time frames, with short, medium and long term goals in mind.

Despite all of these observed differences, I believe there is a process of unification with the recent developments in communication technology. As was stated, the realms of public diplomacy and public relations are melding, as attractiveness and reputation are becoming the new markers of power in the world. Both Melissen and Black each point out that public diplomacy and propaganda have undergone a critical change with the dawn of the information age in their own field, but I assert these should be thought of together. Propaganda and public diplomacy are now being both produced and consumed not only by states, but by a host of actors, including individuals themselves. It harkens Melissen’s polylateralism, where all entities now have the power to influence foreign publics. We can create our own ad or information campaigns and, depending upon the platform, time, and spread of the information, they can greatly affect international relations or conceptions. I believe this is happening to public relations/advertising and public diplomacy simultaneously, and I think it further complicates the ways in which the two can be separated – who is to say an ad campaign that positively affects a foreign public is not a form of public diplomacy or vice versa?

This will need further analysis as more cases come out, but I wanted to raise the initial question.