Gregory makes the argument that since “public diplomacy is now so central to diplomacy …it is no longer helpful to treat it as a sub-set of diplomatic practice. The term marginalizes what has become ‘woven into the fabric of mainstream diplomatic activity’” (Gregory, 353). Indeed, the influx of technology, research, and the Obama administration’s framing of public diplomacy has helped evolved our conception of public diplomacy’s role and place in U.S. foreign policy. Gregory makes the astute observation that public diplomacy is no longer a sub-set of diplomacy, is an absolute “mindset” required of all multilateral diplomatic actors in the future.
It is clear that as an institution, public diplomacy has become a multi-stakeholder instrument that has been integrated into modern diplomatic practice. As a result, U.S. public diplomacy’s institutions, methods and priorities require transformation rather than adaptation, Gregory argues. He has a litany of areas for improvement: “Rethinking fortress embassies, the role of foreign ministries, risk assessments for diplomats among the people, recruitment, training and professional education, resource limitations, Congressional oversight, legal and regulatory authorities, international broadcasting and inter-agency direction,” to name a few.
Now and in the future, I believe American fortress embassies are a reality we must contend with—but there should be accommodations made in areas where it is reasonable. In 2009, during my internship at the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, I observed that the newly-built embassy featured a playground for children and wide lawns, with a slatted iron fence instead of the typical reinforced concrete walls that often surrounded the latest generation of U.S. embassy structures. The fence had large spaces between in the slats and the embassy grounds hosted a garden easily viewed from the sidewalk. The Public Affairs Section also hung artwork from a student contest on the embassy fence, making the fence seem less like a barrier and more of a formality.
The United States is rich in its numbers of social entrepreneurs, start-up business owners, and tech-savvy players. As a part of its efforts to foster a long-term vision of public diplomacy, U.S. public diplomacy practitioners would do well to listen to and network with what Gregory deems as “voices outside government,” people who “are exploring ways to leverage civil society’s knowledge, skills and creativity through a new independent, non-profit institution — a networked capacity that is intended to enable government instruments, not to duplicate or compete with them” (Gregory, 368).
On the subject of recruitment, the U.S. Foreign Service needs to look like the rest of America. As Ambassador Ruth Davis has pointed out, the Foreign Service should recruit members that are representative of the United States people, paying particular attention to fostering diversity by recruiting people from different backgrounds, walks of life, areas of the country, and with (non-traditional policy) expertise. Fellowship programs such as the Thomas R. Pickering and Charles B. Rangel fellowships provide young people--especially minorities and women--with invaluable opportunities to apply their talent and skills for a career in public service. The government would do well to continue to fund such opportunities.
Finally, members of Congress should have long-term interests in supporting the transformation of U.S. public diplomacy and its institutions. Going forward, Congress should reauthorize the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and authorize larger amounts of funding and research so that the function of public diplomacy will be funded almost as much as the amounts dispensed to its military counterpart.
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