Wednesday, June 20, 2012

Middle Powers and the Limitations of Public Diplomacy


Eytan Gilboa defines middle powers as states that lack the resources of great powers but provide multilateral leadership on global issues including “economic development and foreign aid, and human rights, human security, environmental protection and health.” There is not unanimous agreement on which states qualify as middle powers, and as Andrew Cooper notes, global power dynamics are in a constant state of flux. However, some of the commonly agreed upon middle powers include Canada, Australia, and Mexico. Because they lack the resources of great powers, public diplomacy is a major asset for middle power diplomacy. These middle powers are often ignored or pigeonholed by the rest of the world. Public diplomacy offers an efficient way to gain attention and influence. Despite many success stories, the cases of Mexico and Australia show us the limitations of public diplomacy.

Mexico shows us public diplomacy’s inadequate powers in the face of serious domestic problems. Pamela K. Starr provides a list of the obstacles facing Mexico’s influence and reputation. What is most damaging to its national reputation is the violence resulting from the drug war. To compensate for the homicides and horrors, Mexico has tried to promote itself as a beautiful tourist destination and the birthplace of a storied culture. While they might succeed at generating interest in Mexican beaches and art, these public diplomacy initiatives can’t support Mexico’s diplomatic goals. As countless public diplomacy scholars have pointed out, foreign publics aren’t stupid or naïve. They won’t be fooled by attempts to cover up crime and corruption with culture and cuisine. Even the slickest public diplomacy campaigns can’t gloss over the tens of thousands of deaths Mexico has seen over the past several years. The solution lies in policies that put an end to the violence and not in public diplomacy.   

Caitlin Byrne’s chronicle of Australia’s campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council brings up a host of other shortcomings of public diplomacy for middle powers. Caitlin Byrne’s publication on the bid, announced in 2008, hints at the challenges of proving oneself to the world. Middle powers, by their very nature, are limited in the scope of their international involvement.  And yet to win a spot on the Security Council they need to sufficiently impress at least two-thirds of the General Assembly to earn their votes. It’s difficult to launch a global campaign since certain messages play better with certain audiences. Secondly, depending on the type of public diplomacy, it may be too long-term for the immediate diplomatic agenda. Cultural exchanges, for example, are very effective public diplomacy tools and help to foster international relationships. Yet they aren’t particularly useful when campaigning for a seat on the UNSC.

In effect, the limits of public diplomacy operate across the board. Good PD is not a substitute for good policy. The same messages and values that attract some might alienate others. And long-term initiatives are not always an appealing strategy for reputations that need immediate bolstering. Even the great powers have had to understand this. The United States is an apt example. For so long Americans have considered freedom and democracy to be universal values. Only recently has the U.S. started to realize that those words hold different meanings for different cultures. Spreading that message to some areas of the world but not others would be hypocritical, and abandoning the message altogether would be disingenuous. 

Friday, June 15, 2012

New Resources, New Challenges for Indian Public Diplomacy

There is no such thing as a seamless public diplomacy strategy. Throughout our readings and research we have seen that in the process of projecting an attractive and legitimate image to a foreign public there has always been some internal or external factor that inhibits its full effect. In the case of China, the deterrent was its history of human rights abuses and stifled response to crises. In Taiwan, it was a lack of involvement on the international stage in multi-lateral relations and associations. In Japan, it was too much focus on spreading popular culture and not enough on promoting their foreign policy agenda.

Now we have India, the world's largest democracy, that is dealing with its own set of unique opportunities and pitfalls in public diplomacy. I will detail these as "resources" and "challenges".

Resources:

India has a very advanced IT sector, which puts it in a great position to use this as leverage for public diplomacy strategies. Examples of utilizing this strength come in the form of adaptation to e-diplomacy, e-governance, ICT4D and digital diplomacy via social networks or other means of transnational communication. The Ministry of External Affairs website exemplifies many of these characteristics as they reach out via Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, have enabled platforms for Indian diasporics to connect and publish content regularly.

Another resource is what is referred to as the "soft" aspect of their hard power. Politically, they are the world's largest democracy and a long-standing one at that. Although it hasn't been widely noticed on a global scale, it has had an affect on regional democracy building in places like Nepal and Pakistan. India is in a position to use their history to actively promote politically to some of the world's most sensitive areas like Iran and Syria, which aligns India closer in relations to the US.

Jumping off of that point, India still maintains its appeal to developing states. Because India is still in many ways developing itself, it can easily reach out and form relationships with Asian, Middle Eastern or African countries for purposes of mutual development. This has already been started with the Indiafrica project, seeking to build relations between African countries and India.

Challenges:

One glaring challenge for India is that it is late in the game of public diplomacy. Although their presence is definitely felt in, they only began implementing public diplomacy in 2006 and are still experimenting with how exactly to apply it in an Indian context that will encapsulate the state.

This presents another issue for India, diversity. Attempts to brand or project a unified India are extremely difficult due to a diverse and complex demographic, consisting of many ethnic groups, languages, religions, castes, political groups and economic statuses. This harkens some of the same troubles even the US has in nation-branding, as it houses an array of citizens and many times it is difficult to convey one image or culture to foreign publics.

As is the case with many states, there is confusion between the foreign and the domestic audience in public diplomacy. India seems to be targeting Indians for development purposes as well as foreign publics who they would like to be aware of what is happening in the state. However, the question then becomes whether their credibility is being compromised by doing this. Internal studies show that Indians do not feel their country is strong or powerful enough to have influence over other nations, which indicates that different narratives need to be employed for foreign and domestic audiences.

Finally, India has followed in the footsteps of Japan and South Korea by overtly projecting culture and tourism to foreign audiences rather than taking a stance on foreign policy or even integrating that stance into their cultural communications. The Incredible India campaign has been very popular and visitors to India have increased significantly, but is this public diplomacy or is this tourism? Can it be both? This goes along with their soft power approach, and it has had some success, but in continued efforts there should be some policy backing. Otherwise India will be liked but not seen as powerful or influential, which is the opposite intention of PD strategy.

In a quick summation, I would argue that India needs to engage its domestic audience in a nationalistic campaign, uniting them under one India and boosting self-image. This is a key starting point before public diplomacy will function for them. Then, once this is improved, India can begin engaging their citizenry or government with foreign publics using their advanced IT arena, not only promoting culture but backing that up with a democratic or developmental goal. This way, other nations will look to India for influence or aid when it comes to political or economic factors, thereby giving India a large foothold. The effect should be cyclical, as this increased attention will strengthen India's name and importance on a global scale while simultaneously improving self-image.

Thursday, June 14, 2012

Leveraging "Cool Japan"


How has the notion of “Cool Japan” been leveraged to promote Japan’s public diplomacy initiatives?
Japan’s main public diplomacy objectives are to “ deepen understanding of Japan among people in other countries and boost Japan’s image overseas”. Anime and manga have both been two cultural tools used by the Japanese to leverage their soft power influence.  The concept of “Cool Japan” has had a large attraction overseas.
Japanese traditional as well as contemporary values are reflected in its “Cool Japan” brand. As more and more people become aware and familiar with cultural aspects such as anime, manga, and K-pop, Japanese cultural values become more accessible to the outside world. “Cool Japan” works as a branding instrument for soft power where it presents a unified, cultural message of Japan.
Anime and manga have also influenced Japanese language initiatives between the United States and Japan. For example, the popularity of anime has extended to countries where Japanese is not the prominent language, thus needing to be dubbed to be understood. Instead of waiting months for language dubbing, anime has acted as a catalyst to promote Japanese language interest among students who would wish to watch anime in its original context. The increase in language exchange programs would thus create greater people-to-people connections and inherently increase a state’s soft power capabilities in the long run.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also used “Cool Japan” as a way to bring together people from diverse backgrounds. In the case of the Third International Manga Award competition, participants came from all over the world. Exhibitions such as the World Expo provide public diplomacy opportunities where Japan can not only showcase the anime and manga popularity, but also Japanese cultural traditions as well.
In the international realm, it has been difficult for Japan to overcome the negative aspects of its colonial past. Tensions between South Korea and China regarding past historical events will take greater public diplomacy efforts than just “Cool Japan”. It will be interesting to compare the Chinese and Japanese diplomacy efforts and changing economic situations. Will Japan’s public diplomacy efforts be enough to escape the shadow of a rising China?


Wednesday, June 13, 2012

India should balance capacity and capability



In his article on “India’s Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations,” Christian Wagner examines India’s soft power in several contexts—the U.S.-dominated military context; our contemporary globalized context with empowered nation-states and non-state actors; and the ever important international economic context. By providing several categories for understanding “soft power capacities”—culture, political values, and foreign policy—Wagner highlights India’s immediate advantages in its public diplomacy practices. He does so by underscoring its strong democratic traditions in a post-colonial society, Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy of non-violent engagement and peaceful conflict resolution, its promotion of India as a global technology hub and investment destination, its storied engagement in multilateral diplomacy, and its increasingly popular Bollywood film industry.

He concludes that while positive perceptions of India’s social and political values assist in fostering its soft power, such perceptions are only a stamp of approval and not an acknowledgement of influence. In other words, although India has incredible brand power and potential, it currently lacks the star-appeal of other soft-power giants for a few reasons: (1) India’s values and practice of democracy are not perceived as models for the rest of the world; (2) India favors attracting foreign direct investment to its own land and is very slow in fostering its own political, social, and/or economic investment in other countries that could benefit from its leadership; and (3) Indian society is just beginning to comprehend its diversity and its identity.

While it is evident India boasts a number of strengths in effectively leveraging soft power to project its desired image of a tech-savvy and sexy investment destination, the regional hegemon is missing critical foreign policy considerations and long-term strategies in its public diplomacy vision and practice. These missing long-range considerations will give rise to foreign policy challenges that India will likely face down the road. One limitation to India’s soft power capacity is its emphasis on capacity over hard power capabilities. Moreover, its use and aims of soft power seem to stray from its menu of hard power.

Second, India is the world’s largest democracy—heir to the storied legacy of Gandhi—and yet it has been shockingly slow in seeking to promote its democratic ideals abroad and exert influence. Despite its strategic location bordering Burma (Myanmar), India failed to step forward to strongly support Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic minority and “missed the Burma bus”—allowing regional competitor China to seize influence instead. All this, despite India’s experience as a strong multilateral player.

Wagner highlights how India specifically uses its soft power—by way of its industry, economy, political and social values—to build up its image rather than to exert its influence on foreign policy. However, these factors are capacity-enablers, not capability promoters. As Wagner notes, a nation’s soft power capability allows it to effectively channel its capacities or resources into instruments or initiatives of foreign policy. As I previously emphasized, India could stand to improve a number of its soft power outlets. However, there is one soft power medium India’s public and private organizations could more easily restructure for everyone’s benefit—Bollywood. Wagner is ambiguous when he describes “Bollywood as a quasi-global dream fabric.” It is not clear what he means by this, but I imagine he is trying to describe Bollywood as a medium that delivers the Indian Dream—the endless opportunities for freedom, innovation, romance, and prosperity found in India. As Wagner notes, Bollywood films compared to “Hollywood…do not reflect or promote a universal model for political or cultural development and should therefore be seen as mere entertainment.” While Bollywood films depict the energy and drama of different classes of Indian society and daily life in a glamorized fashion, its soft power influence seemingly pales in comparison to South Korea’s popular K-Dramas.

South Korean dramas have had an extraordinary influence in shaping the country’s national image around the world—even in North Korea, where South Korean materials are verboten but immensely popular. One North Korean defector told the New York Times how influential the K-Dramas were in shaping her perception of the world outside Pyongyang. Popular Korean dramas often feature the newest technologies on their sets—brand new kitchens, electronic accessories in bathrooms—and the characters in most shows often showcase the most luxurious accessories. Although they are just TV dramas, these South Korean productions have ignited a wave of South Korean popularity throughout Asia and Latin America. And while a TV show may just be a fragment of reality, its soft power capital has the potential to change lives, as evidenced by Ahn Mi Ock’s defector story. If India can mimic and invest in a balance between capacity and capability, it will stand to benefit in the long-term.

The Limited Diplomatic Potential of "Cool Japan"


“Cool Japan” is a new public diplomacy program focused on the promotion Japanese pop culture. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) promotes various elements of Japanese subculture including pop music and fashion. The two most famous cultural components are anime and manga.  Cool Japan is an intelligent move by MOFA. As Nakamura writes, the government was able to harness the already existing popularity of anime and manga comics. From this perspective, the program has been successful in promoting attractive aspects of modern Japanese culture. Japan appointed the character Doraemon as an Anime Ambassador. Many American bookstores feature manga sections, which is an important indicator of popularity. Considering the domination of Hollywood films and English-language music on the radio, the U.S. entertainment market is not an easy one to break into. 

Another piece of evidence in support of Cool Japan is the ability of pop culture to generate further interest in Japan. Kenjiro Monji, former director of the Public Diplomacy Department of MOFA said interest in anime and manga inspires fans to study the Japanese language. Furthermore, some fans travel to Japan to visit the sites from their favorite comics or films. In this way, Cool Japan serves as a gateway to greater exploration of Japanese culture. Nakamura also quotes Joseph Nye, who says that a country that utilizes popular channels of communication is more likely to be successful in spreading its messages. Cool Japan leverages its public diplomacy initiatives by appealing to the general public, which is highly effective in terms of the new public diplomacy.

Nakamura writes that some critics find fault with Cool Japan because of its limited appeal. While anime might have many fans, there are just as many people who might find it “frivolous.” This isn’t the most compelling argument, since the same thing could be said about any cultural program in any country. Also, Nakamura focuses his article on anime and manga, which do attract a specific fan base. But there are other aspects of Japanese pop culture that attract different audiences. The newest initiative from Cool Japan will be recreating parts of Tokyo in other cities around the world. This will be no small feat. But even a handful of “Little Tokyo’s” would introduce foreign audiences to a more conventional slice of life in Japan.

So far we can see that Cool Japan has been successful at generating interest in Japanese culture and highlighting the country’s distinctive elements. However, these aren’t Japan’s only diplomatic objectives. Japan wants to demonstrate leadership in international affairs, which includes earning a permanent spot on the UN Security Council, and disseminate a peaceful national image. It is unclear as to whether Cool Japan has the capacity to increase Japan’s soft power to the point of fulfilling these goals.

Nakamura and Kenijo described one argument for Cool Japan as an indicator of leadership. Some Japanese public diplomacy practitioners believe that developing countries, for example Iraq, are interested in emulating Japan’s postwar comeback. According to this view, such countries admire Japan for its ability to modernize while still retaining its culture. Kenijo considers that malleability to be a strength of Japanese culture. That’s an interesting point, but it’s probably not the type of leadership the Security Council regards most highly when evaluating potential new members.

Interestingly enough, while Ogawa writes that Japan sees itself as a source of inspiration for this reason, it is Japan’s very postwar “comeback” that presents a major soft power problem in places like China and South Korea. As Nakamura details, it remains very controversial as to whether Japan issued a proper official apology for its wartime aggressions. This is no small soft power obstacle. Anime and J-pop are fun, maybe even enlightening, but they can’t erase the memories of war. Cool Japan is not enough to realize Japan’s major public diplomacy goals. If Japan wants to be seen as an international leader of harmony and peace, it must atone for its conduct in World War II with an apology and leadership in humanitarian issues. Until then, Cool Japan will only generate a more superficial soft power based mostly on commercial entertainment. 

Friday, June 8, 2012

Another View: Interpreting Chinese Soft Power

A major theme in public diplomacy, or international communication writ-large, is the conception of 'the other'. Scholar Edward Said had articulated 'the other' as a battle between the Western worldview and the Eastern worldview, with history regarding the Western tradition as of late.

We see this pattern in public diplomacy strategies around the world. Democracy has taken hold in many nations and the strong influence (whether intentional or not) from the United States has had a vast Westernizing effect where, not by coercion but by attraction, nations have jumped on the American model. However, China and Chinese soft power is now beginning to play counter to that notion.

According to Yiwei Wang's "Public Diplomacy & The Rise of Chinese Soft Power" the cultural characteristics of collectivisim have dictated the methodology of Chinese soft power. Whereas the Western tradition of public diplomacy has the tendency to be splitting, identifying the differences of other parties and seeking to assimilate them, the Chinese tradition is to be introspective and multiplicitous, seeing many versions of 'other' and seeking to change themselves to adapt to the environment.

This deeper-level philosophy would seem to work very well in public diplomacy, as other nations would appreciate China not seeking to change them, but rather altering themselves and engaging in such things as cultural exchange to gain influence. These messages are also coming from a highly centralized and strong (politically and economically) government, so their communications are far-reaching and backed by plenty of resources.

However, there have been many setbacks in China that have conflicted with this understanding of public diplomacy.

For having a society based upon morality, exchange and understanding China has had a number of human rights issues in such areas as the workplace, social roles and natural disaster management. There is also a complete disconnect in the realm of media diplomacy, which is popular in the Western tradition but is only starting to catch on in China with agencies like CCTV. China has a history of engaging in censorship of information for the protection of their own citizenry, but as of late this has become more of a problem for the Chinese government to control given the opening of information access worldwide.

I think China's interpretation of soft power is so widely talked about because its political and economic sectors are so strong. However, because initial studies have shown Chinese soft power strategies are not having a positive effect, I think it is safe to say their conception of public diplomacy needs tweaking and must become consistent with their domestic efforts in order to provide a harmonious message to the world. This must also be considered a long-term effort, despite China's realtively quick rise politically and economically.

Taiwan's Public Diplomacy Challenges and Opportunities


What are the challenges and opportunities for Taiwanese public diplomacy?

Gerald Chan best described Taiwan’s situation as “financially rich but diplomatically poor”.  While Taiwan has built a strong economic foundation, this financial stability does not translate into soft power. The concept of soft power can be drawn back to Joseph Nye, where “public diplomacy helps transform soft power resources into tangible improvements in the international state” (Rockower, 110) However, Taiwan faces several challenges, the main difficulty being the issue of Taiwan’s legitimacy and its international recognition. Yet, Taiwan’s democratic identity help enhance its public diplomacy efforts as a means of a shared cultural identity with other democratic nations.

 The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs helps conduct polylateral public diplomacy within global civil society. (Rockower, 110) The MOFA has helped Taiwan increase its public diplomacy efforts by facilitating people-to-people diplomacy. One of these strategies has been through international language and cultural exchanges. These exchanges will help the diffusion of Taiwanese cultural values and increase people-to-people contact. Taiwanese exchange programs are also common with those from democratic nations who

Taiwan’s investment in gastrodiplomacy is an opportunity that will help support the establishment of Taiwanese restaurants abroad in an effort to mimic the success of Thailand’s gastrodiplomacy strategies. Gastrodiplomacy can help publicize Taiwanese national brands.

Taiwan biggest challenge is its lack of recognition from the international community under that shadow of China’s economic and political dominance. Taiwan only has formal diplomatic relations with 23 minor powers and does not have any formal relations with any major power. (Rawnsley, 1) Taiwan lacks the international clout demonstrated by China, but also a distinct, unified national image to promote themselves with.  Taiwan also lacks the hard power capabilities to that of China and any public diplomacy effort that might upset China puts Taiwan in dangerous territory.