US Public Diplomacy: The Future Is Now

For United States diplomats and civil society actors alike, the future is most certainly now. We're beyond feelings of resistance to public diplomacy, or even conceiving of public diplomacy as something separate from diplomacy, as Bruce Gregory indicated in his work, American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation. Although traditional government-to-government and diplomat-to-diplomat high level communications are still occurring every day, it is the outreach to public that solidifies power and influence of one state "over" another or "with" another.

Public diplomacy is the diplomacy of both the current age and of the future for not only the US, but for the world.

With heightened world presence, other powers such as China, Japan, India, Brazil and South Korea are progressing in their own public diplomacy strategies, which puts the US in an interesting position. More or less the primary source of political, economic and informational influence in the world following WWII, the US is now coming to terms as other nations, many of which have received assistance from the US for development purposes, innovate and develop in sectors that the US does not have the capacity to manage as succinctly. Some of the Scandinavian countries as well as South Korea have better Internet penetration. Education systems are competing to be internationally accredited and attract US students to their countries. Nations are banding together in regional coalitions to gain multilateral power and authority able to coincide with international bodies.

Appropriately enough, this message came through in a meme shared by non-profit organization The Other 98%:

The question becomes: how does the US reposition itself in the international arena? This is where some of the initiatives of the Obama administration have come in, such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Senior Adviser for Innovation Alec Ross' notion of 21st Century Statecraft. This strategy utilizes public diplomacy and information communication technology as a central driver to maintaining a foothold in the world. By being the world's largest and most powerful advocate for the right to 'connect,' the US has been able to improve its international image, but even this has had some cracks.

State Department stance on Internet freedom, for example, has been influential in countries like Egypt, Iran and Burma, but while this stance is projected, the battle over intellectual property rights online sees the US seizing both onshore and offshore websites engaging in "questionable activity". In this instance, there needs to be a consistency in message and action, a strategy the US must utilize given we are in an age where information is so free-flowing and transparent.

Transforming U.S. public diplomacy

Given the lessons learned from practice abroad and from conceptual/theoretical proposals, how should the United States respond to the challenges facing its public diplomacy?

Gregory makes the argument that since “public diplomacy is now so central to diplomacy …it is no longer helpful to treat it as a sub-set of diplomatic practice. The term marginalizes what has become ‘woven into the fabric of mainstream diplomatic activity’” (Gregory, 353). Indeed, the influx of technology, research, and the Obama administration’s framing of public diplomacy has helped evolved our conception of public diplomacy’s role and place in U.S. foreign policy. Gregory makes the astute observation that public diplomacy is no longer a sub-set of diplomacy, is an absolute “mindset” required of all multilateral diplomatic actors in the future.

It is clear that as an institution, public diplomacy has become a multi-stakeholder instrument that has been integrated into modern diplomatic practice. As a result, U.S. public diplomacy’s institutions, methods and priorities require transformation rather than adaptation, Gregory argues. He has a litany of areas for improvement: “Rethinking fortress embassies, the role of foreign ministries, risk assessments for diplomats among the people, recruitment, training and professional education, resource limitations, Congressional oversight, legal and regulatory authorities, international broadcasting and inter-agency direction,” to name a few.

Now and in the future, I believe American fortress embassies are a reality we must contend with—but there should be accommodations made in areas where it is reasonable. In 2009, during my internship at the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, I observed that the newly-built embassy featured a playground for children and wide lawns, with a slatted iron fence instead of the typical reinforced concrete walls that often surrounded the latest generation of U.S. embassy structures. The fence had large spaces between in the slats and the embassy grounds hosted a garden easily viewed from the sidewalk. The Public Affairs Section also hung artwork from a student contest on the embassy fence, making the fence seem less like a barrier and more of a formality.

The United States is rich in its numbers of social entrepreneurs, start-up business owners, and tech-savvy players. As a part of its efforts to foster a long-term vision of public diplomacy, U.S. public diplomacy practitioners would do well to listen to and network with what Gregory deems as “voices outside government,” people who “are exploring ways to leverage civil society’s knowledge, skills and creativity through a new independent, non-profit institution — a networked capacity that is intended to enable government instruments, not to duplicate or compete with them” (Gregory, 368).

On the subject of recruitment, the U.S. Foreign Service needs to look like the rest of America. As Ambassador Ruth Davis has pointed out, the Foreign Service should recruit members that are representative of the United States people, paying particular attention to fostering diversity by recruiting people from different backgrounds, walks of life, areas of the country, and with (non-traditional policy) expertise. Fellowship programs such as the Thomas R. Pickering and Charles B. Rangel fellowships provide young people--especially minorities and women--with invaluable opportunities to apply their talent and skills for a career in public service. The government would do well to continue to fund such opportunities.

Finally, members of Congress should have long-term interests in supporting the transformation of U.S. public diplomacy and its institutions. Going forward, Congress should reauthorize the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and authorize larger amounts of funding and research so that the function of public diplomacy will be funded almost as much as the amounts dispensed to its military counterpart.

My Reply to "Improvements to US Public Diplomacy"

http://haydenpd.blogspot.com/2012/06/improvements-to-us-public-diplomacy.html?showComment=1340939459919#c7574556137774286800

Tips for Success: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century

The 21^st century has changed the game of public diplomacy by injecting more players and new tools. During the first twelve years of the new century, the U.S. has learned several lessons about how to succeed in public diplomacy with these new rules. Alec Ross presents one of the lessons – the lesson that technology is a neutral tool. Developments in the Middle East during and after the Arab Spring highlighted that technologies can be used to enforce existing ideologies. They are just as potent for protesters as for authoritarian governments. A second lesson is that public information is global information. The traditional separation between U.S. public diplomacy and public affairs is impractical and illogical.

Knowing all of this, U.S. public diplomacy faces a host of challenges, ranging from organizational issues to the rise of citizen diplomacy. A condensed list might look like this, with each item building on the previous:

• National strategy
• Organizational issues
• More stakeholders

The first challenge is the lack of a national strategy for public diplomacy. Many observers have commented on the Obama administration’s philosophy of engagement. As Bruce Gregory notes, it is not entirely clear what engagement should mean. He cautions that it has many opportunities to fail, for instance if engagement reinforces negative stereotypes.

The second challenge includes the organizational issues inherent in how the U.S. conceptualizes public diplomacy. Nakamura and Weed note that the hierarchy of public diplomacy officials implies a lack of importance. They write that making the PD leader an undersecretary reporting to the Secretary of State makes public diplomacy seem inferior to traditional diplomacy. Another related issue is the ambiguous role of other agencies such as the Department of Defense and USAID. Without a national strategy to guide coordination, messages might be mixed and/or conflicting.

Finally, the third overarching challenge is the influx of public diplomacy stakeholders. The traditional diplomats are no longer the only actors. Aside from civil society groups and the private sector, average citizens are empowered by their technologies. The current administration embraces people-to-people diplomacy. As Gregory points out, citizen diplomacy might not always accomplish the government’s goals. American citizens’ opinions could likely contradict U.S. foreign policies. On a related note, U.S. public diplomacy practitioners have not yet grasped the nuances of networks. Ross calls networks a “defining feature in the new global power structure.” Not understanding the structure and dynamics of networks will be very damaging to U.S. public diplomacy.  

To resolve these problems, Gregory asserts that the United States needs to transform the way it does public diplomacy. This transformation includes changing the mindset of always needing to be in control. U.S. public diplomacy needs to insert itself into the global networks of citizens and civil society. Top-down or one-way communication is no longer an option.

One of Gregory’s main points is absolutely on target. The U.S. needs to devote more resources to evaluating its efforts. The difficulty of measuring success is a problem for any state. A different approach could be spend more time evaluating programs before they are implemented. Questions to ask include: Which agency is best equipped to address this need? How can other state agencies and public diplomacy actors complement their efforts?

Another solution is to be prepared for international developments. Ross says that public diplomacy practitioners must respond to the disruptions in international relations caused by technology. The U.S. should take this notion a step further by preempting the disruptions. Gerald Howarth, Britain’s Minister for International Security Strategy, spoke yesterday at CSIS. His speech centered on defense, but the major points can easily be applied to public diplomacy. Howarth spoke of “meeting challenges upstream.” What he meant is that so many world events come as a surprise. If the U.S. were to devote more resources to research, in Washington and abroad, there would be greater potential to anticipate. In addition, focusing so much attention on one region at the expense of others is a flawed concept. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. turned its attention to an area of the world that it had previously ignored. Having its pulse on every region of the world could let the U.S. be proactive rather than reactive.

Defining Nation Branding in Middle Power Public Diplomacy

Geopolitics have consistently evolved since the Cold War, and have given rise to a large number of nations which ascribe to a status referred to as a ‘Middle Power’. These nations, South Africa, South Korea, Canada and Australia among them, have attained a level of stability, ingenuity or leadership in a certain domestic sectors, which enable them to compete with superpowers such as the United States and China. However, these nations are still dealing with internal or international development in other facets.


One way in which middle powers can attempt to assert themselves against conceptions of inferiority is nation branding, or the process of acutely strategizing information, products and practices that positively affect how other countries view them. These branding strategies are oftentimes synonymous with other diplomatic or public diplomacy efforts.


In my opinion, nation branding retains the ability to be classified as or synonymous with public diplomacy only if it meets certain conditions. If the intention behind the nation brand is to advance a state’s foreign policy agenda (whether that be through multilateral partnerships, soft power strategies, economic ties, etc.) then I believe it should be considered an arm of public diplomacy, as it does assist in the control over image, message and attractiveness of a state.  Ideally, the nation brand reflects an accurate depiction of the country. When this image is not depicted correctly, there can be disagreements from such parties as the foreign public, the international media or the domestic public.  This is exemplified in the Brand Kenya campaign, where Kenyan nationals are shown to not have a high level of patriotism due to internal conditions like importation, violence and corruption.


What I do not believe is public diplomacy is when a national branding strategy is created for purely commercial purposes. Within this context, nation branding is more closely related to propaganda or advertising, as there is not always the guarantee of legitimacy or credibility behind the image or message and there may not be ample space for dialogue within the strategy. Association is also a factor. Brand Kenya, although a legitimate nation brand, was crafted by PR firm Interbrand Sampson, which also has commercial products such as AT&T and Wrigley in their repertoire. Eytan Gilboa reflected on this when he noted that nation brands must be prepared to be very flexible with their product, as public diplomacy is a fluid process.


I think it is also crucial to consider intention of nation branding strategies that do not have foreign policy goals besides increasing international recognition and attractiveness. Popularity in the international arena is not public diplomacy because it should not be an end in itself, but rather a means to an end of specific foreign policy objectives.


It may be easy for a ‘middle power’ to consider their nation branding strategy a form of public diplomacy, despite the fact there are purely commercial entities conducting it. As is also described by Gilboa, middle powers are characteristically strapped for resources in public diplomacy, yet must constantly strive to remain sustainable and influential within their sector, lest succumb to the fluidity of the geopolitical sphere.  

My response to "The Limits of Country Branding"

"The Limits of Country Branding"

My response to classmate Alejandro Neyra's post found by clicking here.

The Boston Globe makes note of the nation-building as a trend, reporting on how “the last few years have seen an explosion of ‘nation-branding,’ shorthand for coordinated government efforts to manage a country's image, whether to improve tourism, investment, or even foreign relations” (Risen, 2005). As Alejandro points out, Mexico, South Korea, and other middle powers are no exception. These middle powers are invested in gaining soft power, 'top of mind awareness,' cultural leverage, and a means to foster mutually beneficial relationships with its own constituents, prospective investors, potential customers, and/or other countries. Cesar Villanueva Rivas highlights how some countries, such as Mexico, are compelled to remake its image in effort to dispel the negative press that has plagued the country since it experienced a surge in "narco-violence." Other developing middle powers, such as South Korea, are trying to polish their public image to foster their influence. This is illustrated in Sook-Jung Lee's briefing on "South Korea's Soft Power Diplomacy," where he underscores how "South Korea’s national image and values for [the brand concept of a] Global Korea should be prosperous, democratic, modest, nonthreatening, and culturally syncretic, since many Third World countries see South Korea as a model with its simultaneous achievement of development and democratization” (Lee, 2009). One tactic indispensable to South Korea's branding strategy relies on translating its commercial and private sector success--Samsung's or LG's brand power for example--into soft power. The other tactic that is critical to South Korea's branding strategy is that it must follow through with the realization that branding, to put it in Alejandro's words, "is not only about having a commercial logo or a catchy slogan," but about building trust and fostering a credible rapport with the public.

This tactic goes beyond branding and moves into the realm of public diplomacy, which not only promotes the understanding of a nation's brand, but also the understanding of its culture, heritage, and people. In a sense, governments seeking to create their own brands and grow brand value also want to “develop [an] emotional, positive reaction between their part of the world and citizens...[they] want to make or re-make their image in the world to gain clout vis-à-vis their neighbors to achieve certain political ends” (Youde, 2009). In order to pique and develop the public's empathy for and/or sense of connection to a brand, a nation must look to its public diplomacy programming. As Alejandro also notes, public diplomacy is intrinsic to branding—and not secondary to it—because it provides various groups with the possibility to interact with, learn from, and connect to others. In other words, branding alone has its limits, but when combined with public diplomacy and people-to-people initiatives, the two have the power to building bridge across cultures, fostering mutual understanding within a larger regional or global community.

Just as branding is indispensable to shaping and communicating brand value, so too is public diplomacy to “helping audiences identify with” nation-states and “encouraging them to buy its products and services” (van Ham, 2002). And just as Lee emphasizes how “the soft power of a country operates in constant interaction with its hard power,” so too does public diplomacy operate in tandem with nation-branding.

The Critical Role of Public Diplomacy to Middle Powers

In the realm of international relations, middle powers face several challenges in respect to their representation, influence, and legitimacy. Middle powers have limited resources, yet they aspire to influence central events and processes in contemporary international relations [Gilboa: 2006, 27]. In order to have a say in international relations, middle powers use public diplomacy as a tool to engage with the public about their initiatives, national identity to increase global awareness about their status and garner support for their goals.

Canada used a global initiative in order to strengthen their soft power outreach as well as global leadership skills through public diplomacy. Canada undertook a campaign to ban landmines despite opposition by larger powers. By taking on this initiative, Canada was able to connect with like-minded states and increased their global presence by employing public diplomacy to raise awareness. [Gilboa: 2006, 25]

Using the tool of public diplomacy is important in enhancing a middle power’s ability to influence foreign affairs. Where middle powers might lack the economic, resource, and military might of those of the larger powers, they rely heavily on public diplomacy to carefully craft their image and at times likeability to garner external support. The United Nations Security Council provides one example where states with strong public diplomacy efforts can affect a state’s ability “in shaping global agendas and responding to global issues, to engage and negotiate with significant international powers on a regular basis, and consequently to raise their own medium and long-term international profile and standing.” [Bryne: 2011, 7]

In the case of a non-permanent UNSC seat, the competition is fierce and candidates must secure at least two-thirds of the available and eligible General Assembly votes of about 128. [Bryne: 2011, 12] Thus, other state’s perception matters greatly in matters such as these and tools of public diplomacy can be used to help secure votes to help increase a state’s global influence.  Countries such as South Korea also use their public diplomacy efforts to support their “footprint” in both the region and globally.[Lee: 2009, 2]

Middle powers are generally viewed as having less material resources and global influence than great powers and must rely on tools of public diplomacy to advocate their country initiatives, national identity, and increase global awareness of their work as good global citizens and mediators. Where these states lack in material resources they must compensate for promoting their self-image to gain participation in international relations.

Middle Powers and the Limitations of Public Diplomacy

Eytan Gilboa defines middle powers as states that lack the resources of great powers but provide multilateral leadership on global issues including “economic development and foreign aid, and human rights, human security, environmental protection and health.” There is not unanimous agreement on which states qualify as middle powers, and as Andrew Cooper notes, global power dynamics are in a constant state of flux. However, some of the commonly agreed upon middle powers include Canada, Australia, and Mexico. Because they lack the resources of great powers, public diplomacy is a major asset for middle power diplomacy. These middle powers are often ignored or pigeonholed by the rest of the world. Public diplomacy offers an efficient way to gain attention and influence. Despite many success stories, the cases of Mexico and Australia show us the limitations of public diplomacy.

Mexico shows us public diplomacy’s inadequate powers in the face of serious domestic problems. Pamela K. Starr provides a list of the obstacles facing Mexico’s influence and reputation. What is most damaging to its national reputation is the violence resulting from the drug war. To compensate for the homicides and horrors, Mexico has tried to promote itself as a beautiful tourist destination and the birthplace of a storied culture. While they might succeed at generating interest in Mexican beaches and art, these public diplomacy initiatives can’t support Mexico’s diplomatic goals. As countless public diplomacy scholars have pointed out, foreign publics aren’t stupid or naïve. They won’t be fooled by attempts to cover up crime and corruption with culture and cuisine. Even the slickest public diplomacy campaigns can’t gloss over the tens of thousands of deaths Mexico has seen over the past several years. The solution lies in policies that put an end to the violence and not in public diplomacy.   

Caitlin Byrne’s chronicle of Australia’s campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council brings up a host of other shortcomings of public diplomacy for middle powers. Caitlin Byrne’s publication on the bid, announced in 2008, hints at the challenges of proving oneself to the world. Middle powers, by their very nature, are limited in the scope of their international involvement.  And yet to win a spot on the Security Council they need to sufficiently impress at least two-thirds of the General Assembly to earn their votes. It’s difficult to launch a global campaign since certain messages play better with certain audiences. Secondly, depending on the type of public diplomacy, it may be too long-term for the immediate diplomatic agenda. Cultural exchanges, for example, are very effective public diplomacy tools and help to foster international relationships. Yet they aren’t particularly useful when campaigning for a seat on the UNSC.

In effect, the limits of public diplomacy operate across the board. Good PD is not a substitute for good policy. The same messages and values that attract some might alienate others. And long-term initiatives are not always an appealing strategy for reputations that need immediate bolstering. Even the great powers have had to understand this. The United States is an apt example. For so long Americans have considered freedom and democracy to be universal values. Only recently has the U.S. started to realize that those words hold different meanings for different cultures. Spreading that message to some areas of the world but not others would be hypocritical, and abandoning the message altogether would be disingenuous. 

New Resources, New Challenges for Indian Public Diplomacy

There is no such thing as a seamless public diplomacy strategy. Throughout our readings and research we have seen that in the process of projecting an attractive and legitimate image to a foreign public there has always been some internal or external factor that inhibits its full effect. In the case of China, the deterrent was its history of human rights abuses and stifled response to crises. In Taiwan, it was a lack of involvement on the international stage in multi-lateral relations and associations. In Japan, it was too much focus on spreading popular culture and not enough on promoting their foreign policy agenda.

Now we have India, the world's largest democracy, that is dealing with its own set of unique opportunities and pitfalls in public diplomacy. I will detail these as "resources" and "challenges".

Resources:

India has a very advanced IT sector, which puts it in a great position to use this as leverage for public diplomacy strategies. Examples of utilizing this strength come in the form of adaptation to e-diplomacy, e-governance, ICT4D and digital diplomacy via social networks or other means of transnational communication. The Ministry of External Affairs website exemplifies many of these characteristics as they reach out via Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, have enabled platforms for Indian diasporics to connect and publish content regularly.

Another resource is what is referred to as the "soft" aspect of their hard power. Politically, they are the world's largest democracy and a long-standing one at that. Although it hasn't been widely noticed on a global scale, it has had an affect on regional democracy building in places like Nepal and Pakistan. India is in a position to use their history to actively promote politically to some of the world's most sensitive areas like Iran and Syria, which aligns India closer in relations to the US.

Jumping off of that point, India still maintains its appeal to developing states. Because India is still in many ways developing itself, it can easily reach out and form relationships with Asian, Middle Eastern or African countries for purposes of mutual development. This has already been started with the Indiafrica project, seeking to build relations between African countries and India.

Challenges:

One glaring challenge for India is that it is late in the game of public diplomacy. Although their presence is definitely felt in, they only began implementing public diplomacy in 2006 and are still experimenting with how exactly to apply it in an Indian context that will encapsulate the state.

This presents another issue for India, diversity. Attempts to brand or project a unified India are extremely difficult due to a diverse and complex demographic, consisting of many ethnic groups, languages, religions, castes, political groups and economic statuses. This harkens some of the same troubles even the US has in nation-branding, as it houses an array of citizens and many times it is difficult to convey one image or culture to foreign publics.

As is the case with many states, there is confusion between the foreign and the domestic audience in public diplomacy. India seems to be targeting Indians for development purposes as well as foreign publics who they would like to be aware of what is happening in the state. However, the question then becomes whether their credibility is being compromised by doing this. Internal studies show that Indians do not feel their country is strong or powerful enough to have influence over other nations, which indicates that different narratives need to be employed for foreign and domestic audiences.

Finally, India has followed in the footsteps of Japan and South Korea by overtly projecting culture and tourism to foreign audiences rather than taking a stance on foreign policy or even integrating that stance into their cultural communications. The Incredible India campaign has been very popular and visitors to India have increased significantly, but is this public diplomacy or is this tourism? Can it be both? This goes along with their soft power approach, and it has had some success, but in continued efforts there should be some policy backing. Otherwise India will be liked but not seen as powerful or influential, which is the opposite intention of PD strategy.

In a quick summation, I would argue that India needs to engage its domestic audience in a nationalistic campaign, uniting them under one India and boosting self-image. This is a key starting point before public diplomacy will function for them. Then, once this is improved, India can begin engaging their citizenry or government with foreign publics using their advanced IT arena, not only promoting culture but backing that up with a democratic or developmental goal. This way, other nations will look to India for influence or aid when it comes to political or economic factors, thereby giving India a large foothold. The effect should be cyclical, as this increased attention will strengthen India's name and importance on a global scale while simultaneously improving self-image.

Leveraging "Cool Japan"

How has the notion of “Cool Japan” been leveraged to promote Japan’s public diplomacy initiatives?

Japan’s main public diplomacy objectives are to “ deepen understanding of Japan among people in other countries and boost Japan’s image overseas”. Anime and manga have both been two cultural tools used by the Japanese to leverage their soft power influence.  The concept of “Cool Japan” has had a large attraction overseas.

Japanese traditional as well as contemporary values are reflected in its “Cool Japan” brand. As more and more people become aware and familiar with cultural aspects such as anime, manga, and K-pop, Japanese cultural values become more accessible to the outside world. “Cool Japan” works as a branding instrument for soft power where it presents a unified, cultural message of Japan.

Anime and manga have also influenced Japanese language initiatives between the United States and Japan. For example, the popularity of anime has extended to countries where Japanese is not the prominent language, thus needing to be dubbed to be understood. Instead of waiting months for language dubbing, anime has acted as a catalyst to promote Japanese language interest among students who would wish to watch anime in its original context. The increase in language exchange programs would thus create greater people-to-people connections and inherently increase a state’s soft power capabilities in the long run.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also used “Cool Japan” as a way to bring together people from diverse backgrounds. In the case of the Third International Manga Award competition, participants came from all over the world. Exhibitions such as the World Expo provide public diplomacy opportunities where Japan can not only showcase the anime and manga popularity, but also Japanese cultural traditions as well.

In the international realm, it has been difficult for Japan to overcome the negative aspects of its colonial past. Tensions between South Korea and China regarding past historical events will take greater public diplomacy efforts than just “Cool Japan”. It will be interesting to compare the Chinese and Japanese diplomacy efforts and changing economic situations. Will Japan’s public diplomacy efforts be enough to escape the shadow of a rising China?

India should balance capacity and capability

In his article on “India’s Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations,” Christian Wagner examines India’s soft power in several contexts—the U.S.-dominated military context; our contemporary globalized context with empowered nation-states and non-state actors; and the ever important international economic context. By providing several categories for understanding “soft power capacities”—culture, political values, and foreign policy—Wagner highlights India’s immediate advantages in its public diplomacy practices. He does so by underscoring its strong democratic traditions in a post-colonial society, Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy of non-violent engagement and peaceful conflict resolution, its promotion of India as a global technology hub and investment destination, its storied engagement in multilateral diplomacy, and its increasingly popular Bollywood film industry.

He concludes that while positive perceptions of India’s social and political values assist in fostering its soft power, such perceptions are only a stamp of approval and not an acknowledgement of influence. In other words, although India has incredible brand power and potential, it currently lacks the star-appeal of other soft-power giants for a few reasons: (1) India’s values and practice of democracy are not perceived as models for the rest of the world; (2) India favors attracting foreign direct investment to its own land and is very slow in fostering its own political, social, and/or economic investment in other countries that could benefit from its leadership; and (3) Indian society is just beginning to comprehend its diversity and its identity.

While it is evident India boasts a number of strengths in effectively leveraging soft power to project its desired image of a tech-savvy and sexy investment destination, the regional hegemon is missing critical foreign policy considerations and long-term strategies in its public diplomacy vision and practice. These missing long-range considerations will give rise to foreign policy challenges that India will likely face down the road. One limitation to India’s soft power capacity is its emphasis on capacity over hard power capabilities. Moreover, its use and aims of soft power seem to stray from its menu of hard power.

Second, India is the world’s largest democracy—heir to the storied legacy of Gandhi—and yet it has been shockingly slow in seeking to promote its democratic ideals abroad and exert influence. Despite its strategic location bordering Burma (Myanmar), India failed to step forward to strongly support Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic minority and “missed the Burma bus”—allowing regional competitor China to seize influence instead. All this, despite India’s experience as a strong multilateral player.

Wagner highlights how India specifically uses its soft power—by way of its industry, economy, political and social values—to build up its image rather than to exert its influence on foreign policy. However, these factors are capacity-enablers, not capability promoters. As Wagner notes, a nation’s soft power capability allows it to effectively channel its capacities or resources into instruments or initiatives of foreign policy. As I previously emphasized, India could stand to improve a number of its soft power outlets. However, there is one soft power medium India’s public and private organizations could more easily restructure for everyone’s benefit—Bollywood. Wagner is ambiguous when he describes “Bollywood as a quasi-global dream fabric.” It is not clear what he means by this, but I imagine he is trying to describe Bollywood as a medium that delivers the Indian Dream—the endless opportunities for freedom, innovation, romance, and prosperity found in India. As Wagner notes, Bollywood films compared to “Hollywood…do not reflect or promote a universal model for political or cultural development and should therefore be seen as mere entertainment.” While Bollywood films depict the energy and drama of different classes of Indian society and daily life in a glamorized fashion, its soft power influence seemingly pales in comparison to South Korea’s popular K-Dramas.

South Korean dramas have had an extraordinary influence in shaping the country’s national image around the world—even in North Korea, where South Korean materials are verboten but immensely popular. One North Korean defector told the New York Times how influential the K-Dramas were in shaping her perception of the world outside Pyongyang. Popular Korean dramas often feature the newest technologies on their sets—brand new kitchens, electronic accessories in bathrooms—and the characters in most shows often showcase the most luxurious accessories. Although they are just TV dramas, these South Korean productions have ignited a wave of South Korean popularity throughout Asia and Latin America. And while a TV show may just be a fragment of reality, its soft power capital has the potential to change lives, as evidenced by Ahn Mi Ock’s defector story. If India can mimic and invest in a balance between capacity and capability, it will stand to benefit in the long-term.

The Limited Diplomatic Potential of "Cool Japan"

“Cool Japan” is a new public diplomacy program focused on the promotion Japanese pop culture. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) promotes various elements of Japanese subculture including pop music and fashion. The two most famous cultural components are anime and manga.  Cool Japan is an intelligent move by MOFA. As Nakamura writes, the government was able to harness the already existing popularity of anime and manga comics. From this perspective, the program has been successful in promoting attractive aspects of modern Japanese culture. Japan appointed the character Doraemon as an Anime Ambassador. Many American bookstores feature manga sections, which is an important indicator of popularity. Considering the domination of Hollywood films and English-language music on the radio, the U.S. entertainment market is not an easy one to break into. 

Another piece of evidence in support of Cool Japan is the ability of pop culture to generate further interest in Japan. Kenjiro Monji, former director of the Public Diplomacy Department of MOFA said interest in anime and manga inspires fans to study the Japanese language. Furthermore, some fans travel to Japan to visit the sites from their favorite comics or films. In this way, Cool Japan serves as a gateway to greater exploration of Japanese culture. Nakamura also quotes Joseph Nye, who says that a country that utilizes popular channels of communication is more likely to be successful in spreading its messages. Cool Japan leverages its public diplomacy initiatives by appealing to the general public, which is highly effective in terms of the new public diplomacy.

Nakamura writes that some critics find fault with Cool Japan because of its limited appeal. While anime might have many fans, there are just as many people who might find it “frivolous.” This isn’t the most compelling argument, since the same thing could be said about any cultural program in any country. Also, Nakamura focuses his article on anime and manga, which do attract a specific fan base. But there are other aspects of Japanese pop culture that attract different audiences. The newest initiative from Cool Japan will be recreating parts of Tokyo in other cities around the world. This will be no small feat. But even a handful of “Little Tokyo’s” would introduce foreign audiences to a more conventional slice of life in Japan.

So far we can see that Cool Japan has been successful at generating interest in Japanese culture and highlighting the country’s distinctive elements. However, these aren’t Japan’s only diplomatic objectives. Japan wants to demonstrate leadership in international affairs, which includes earning a permanent spot on the UN Security Council, and disseminate a peaceful national image. It is unclear as to whether Cool Japan has the capacity to increase Japan’s soft power to the point of fulfilling these goals.

Nakamura and Kenijo described one argument for Cool Japan as an indicator of leadership. Some Japanese public diplomacy practitioners believe that developing countries, for example Iraq, are interested in emulating Japan’s postwar comeback. According to this view, such countries admire Japan for its ability to modernize while still retaining its culture. Kenijo considers that malleability to be a strength of Japanese culture. That’s an interesting point, but it’s probably not the type of leadership the Security Council regards most highly when evaluating potential new members.

Interestingly enough, while Ogawa writes that Japan sees itself as a source of inspiration for this reason, it is Japan’s very postwar “comeback” that presents a major soft power problem in places like China and South Korea. As Nakamura details, it remains very controversial as to whether Japan issued a proper official apology for its wartime aggressions. This is no small soft power obstacle. Anime and J-pop are fun, maybe even enlightening, but they can’t erase the memories of war. Cool Japan is not enough to realize Japan’s major public diplomacy goals. If Japan wants to be seen as an international leader of harmony and peace, it must atone for its conduct in World War II with an apology and leadership in humanitarian issues. Until then, Cool Japan will only generate a more superficial soft power based mostly on commercial entertainment. 

Another View: Interpreting Chinese Soft Power

A major theme in public diplomacy, or international communication writ-large, is the conception of 'the other'. Scholar Edward Said had articulated 'the other' as a battle between the Western worldview and the Eastern worldview, with history regarding the Western tradition as of late.

We see this pattern in public diplomacy strategies around the world. Democracy has taken hold in many nations and the strong influence (whether intentional or not) from the United States has had a vast Westernizing effect where, not by coercion but by attraction, nations have jumped on the American model. However, China and Chinese soft power is now beginning to play counter to that notion.

According to Yiwei Wang's "Public Diplomacy & The Rise of Chinese Soft Power" the cultural characteristics of collectivisim have dictated the methodology of Chinese soft power. Whereas the Western tradition of public diplomacy has the tendency to be splitting, identifying the differences of other parties and seeking to assimilate them, the Chinese tradition is to be introspective and multiplicitous, seeing many versions of 'other' and seeking to change themselves to adapt to the environment.

This deeper-level philosophy would seem to work very well in public diplomacy, as other nations would appreciate China not seeking to change them, but rather altering themselves and engaging in such things as cultural exchange to gain influence. These messages are also coming from a highly centralized and strong (politically and economically) government, so their communications are far-reaching and backed by plenty of resources.

However, there have been many setbacks in China that have conflicted with this understanding of public diplomacy.

For having a society based upon morality, exchange and understanding China has had a number of human rights issues in such areas as the workplace, social roles and natural disaster management. There is also a complete disconnect in the realm of media diplomacy, which is popular in the Western tradition but is only starting to catch on in China with agencies like CCTV. China has a history of engaging in censorship of information for the protection of their own citizenry, but as of late this has become more of a problem for the Chinese government to control given the opening of information access worldwide.

I think China's interpretation of soft power is so widely talked about because its political and economic sectors are so strong. However, because initial studies have shown Chinese soft power strategies are not having a positive effect, I think it is safe to say their conception of public diplomacy needs tweaking and must become consistent with their domestic efforts in order to provide a harmonious message to the world. This must also be considered a long-term effort, despite China's realtively quick rise politically and economically.

Taiwan's Public Diplomacy Challenges and Opportunities

What are the challenges and opportunities for Taiwanese public diplomacy?

Gerald Chan best described Taiwan’s situation as “financially rich but diplomatically poor”.  While Taiwan has built a strong economic foundation, this financial stability does not translate into soft power. The concept of soft power can be drawn back to Joseph Nye, where “public diplomacy helps transform soft power resources into tangible improvements in the international state” (Rockower, 110) However, Taiwan faces several challenges, the main difficulty being the issue of Taiwan’s legitimacy and its international recognition. Yet, Taiwan’s democratic identity help enhance its public diplomacy efforts as a means of a shared cultural identity with other democratic nations.

 The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs helps conduct polylateral public diplomacy within global civil society. (Rockower, 110) The MOFA has helped Taiwan increase its public diplomacy efforts by facilitating people-to-people diplomacy. One of these strategies has been through international language and cultural exchanges. These exchanges will help the diffusion of Taiwanese cultural values and increase people-to-people contact. Taiwanese exchange programs are also common with those from democratic nations who

Taiwan’s investment in gastrodiplomacy is an opportunity that will help support the establishment of Taiwanese restaurants abroad in an effort to mimic the success of Thailand’s gastrodiplomacy strategies. Gastrodiplomacy can help publicize Taiwanese national brands.

Taiwan biggest challenge is its lack of recognition from the international community under that shadow of China’s economic and political dominance. Taiwan only has formal diplomatic relations with 23 minor powers and does not have any formal relations with any major power. (Rawnsley, 1) Taiwan lacks the international clout demonstrated by China, but also a distinct, unified national image to promote themselves with.  Taiwan also lacks the hard power capabilities to that of China and any public diplomacy effort that might upset China puts Taiwan in dangerous territory.

Taiwan: Shadow or Nation?

What are the challenges and opportunities for Taiwanese public diplomacy?

Paul Rockower outlines a number of suitable opportunities for Taiwan to seize as it continues to address the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China next door. He suggests that Taiwan embrace and advertise its cultural offerings—by assembling a traveling night market—as well as its strategic geopolitical location, democratic values, and economic strength.

With its robust economy and classification as a middle power, Taiwan’s political capital and opportunities rest largely on its promotion of a democratic model, allocation of foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and engagement in polylateral and track II methods of diplomacy as well as on its strategic location vis-à-vis U.S. interests in safeguarding its Pacific presence.

Opportunities for elevating Taiwanese soft power and influence abound: not only could Taiwan construct interactive outposts, online Taiwan Academies and promote gastrodiplomacy programs to represent its interests, heritage, and cultural importance as the true heir of Chinese culture—it could increase its soft power and influence through the expanding on the niches available. Taiwan would reap rewards for pivoting its terms of diplomatic engagement to focus on two key areas, international communication technologies (ICT) and urban housing and development design. Its expertise in these two indispensable topics would likely be universally appreciated.

Since 2007, Taiwan’s sphere of legitimate influence has steadily shrunk, however, despite the government’s efforts at checkbook diplomacy and aid engagement. For example, the government of Costa Rica, which recognized Taiwan as sovereign for over several decades, suddenly switched its allegiance to the PRC overnight—perhaps because it was attracted to Beijing’s offer to build the Costa Rican national stadium in San Jose. Today less than 25 countries officially recognize Taiwan.

Taiwan will continue to face the threat of an ever-expanding China whose enormous assets (i.e. ICT company Huawei Technologies) and mammoth influence will become increasingly difficult to compete with, given its size and scope. And although Taiwan’s aid program managed to broker diplomatic ties throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the same judgment cannot be made today. As R. Ellis highlights, global perception and reception of China is changing for a number of reasons. A growing number of developing countries especially are attracted to China because they bear “hopes for future access to Chinese markets and investment,” interest in China’s role as a possible “counterweight to the United States and Western institutions, and admire its successful economic development model.

As fewer and fewer countries recognize Taiwan and as it is forced to manufacture a “Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics” for public consumption, it is evident that Taiwan’s weight is not what it once was. Only time and strategy will tell whether Taiwan will be able to meet the difficulties posed by its neighbor.

Soft Power - not as black and white as we thought

Soft power and public diplomacy have been interpreted distinctively in China. To understand the differences, it first helps to consider how the Western world defines the concepts. Public diplomacy can be simply explained as seeking to manage the international environment through listening and advocating. Soft power, as originally put forth by Joseph Nye, is an attractive power that co-opts people rather than coerces them. While we tend to think of these concepts as standard, in reality they are Westernized notions. The distinction can be seen clearly with China.

Yiwei Wang, in “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” provides an interesting analysis of how China understands the terms. The first notable distinction he mentions is the Chinese attitude toward propaganda. What has become a dirty word in much of the Western world has a positive connotation in China. Already this presents a huge gap in understanding and creates mistrust from foreigners. Similarly, the country’s early attempts at public diplomacy by instituting news spokesmen were aimed at spreading messages internally. This can be chalked up to translation problems, i.e. mistaking the “public” in PD to mean the Chinese public. It is also a result, as Wang explains, of the Chinese rule of virtue. The first instinct is for self-reflection and not outward examination.

Secondly, China also understands public diplomacy to be primarily about people-to-people diplomacy. A recent official report advised China “to enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests.” This is a significant contrast with U.S. public diplomacy efforts. The emphasis on people and culture is different from the American approach to public diplomacy which relies on media messages. Cultural diplomacy, while still important to the U.S., is seen as more frivolous and harder to measure.

Finally, Wang describes China’s difficulty with conceptualizing soft power in Western terms. Power in China, he says, relates to morality, and in practice it is connected with strategy. According to Gary Rawnsley, this is where China’s understanding of soft power falls short. He says China fails to understand that soft power is an intangible attraction.

Looking at it objectively, the Chinese blend of propaganda and public diplomacy is pretty logical. It makes sense that a state’s messages to the domestic public and foreign publics would be the same. But to a Western PD culture that neurotically tries to separate the two, China’s philosophy appears wrong – so wrong that we cannot accept it. The overarching distinction between conceptions of PD and soft power in China and the West is the difference in credibility. For China, credibility comes in the form of a top-down, official government message about government business. For the West, that’s propaganda and it’s bad. For China, credibility comes in the form of pandas at international zoos. For the West, those pandas are cute and cuddly and couldn’t be more different from the harsh Chinese authoritarian government.  While there shouldn’t be a problem with various conceptions of public diplomacy, when credibility doesn’t translate, the PD is in vain. 

Collaborative Power in Public Diplomacy: Easy Sell, Hard Practice

There is a puzzling and particularly difficult separation in the conception of power in public diplomacy today. As Joseph Nye put it, wielding soft power (or using attention, persuasion and communication to meet some form of foreign policy end) comes in two different forms: "Power Over" and "Power With," with particular emphasis on the former.

In "Power Over," the primary actor implements the public diplomacy strategy with the intent to exert influence over other actors from a centralized effort, excluding influence or suggestion from the target audience prior to implementation. In addition, there is a motive of controlling or at least directly influencing the behaviors/outcomes of the strategy over the target audience.

In "Power With," all the actors are of equal standing in the public diplomacy strategy. In this model, there is no actor that reserves authoritative control or influence, rather, each actor contributes to the strategy and all parties are expected to let other opinions influence their own goals as well as have their goals influence others'. Results or outcomes of the strategy are of equal credit.

Ali Fischer conceived of these two models as a choice between leadership or empowerment, and noted that the classification of intent be seriously considered prior to the implementation of any public diplomacy strategy because mixed messages lead to communication failure between actors.

Finally, Anne Marie Slaughter, in response to Nye's preference of "Power Over" suggested a comprehensive move in public diplomacy towards what she deemed "collaborative power" more along the lines of the "Power With" model.

Now, the problem lies in how to put these approaches together, if at all.

Slaughter mentioned an Egyptian-American blogger being arrested in Cairo, and being released shortly after because she tweeted her situation her followers, who used their various network associations to create a call to action. This isn't the only instance of Twitter working towards the benefit of collaborative power, as a similar situation occurred in Kyrgyzstan. Personally, I'm very thankful for and impressed by this form of collaborative power, but the fact that it occurred organically makes it extremely difficult to apply it to an actor that has a motive of gaining influence via the "Power With" model, whether its up front or not.

In my opinion, both of these models can be employed by any actor at the same time, but it could come at a high cost to the actor's credibility and also depends upon certain factors such as the level of visibility and importance the strategy to international relations.

Certain public diplomacy initiatives like creating an open-source website, user-focused content production, virtual exchange and other such ventures lend themselves more to collaborative power because they are easily completed by a group of distributed participants and may not have as high of visibility, but in order for it to jive with the "Power With" model there needs to be a willingness on all sides to have their contributions or goals altered for the good of the group.

The only way I can conceive of both models working together is if an actor presents themselves as extremely eager to begin the process of collaborative power with other actors and sticks to that strategy. If one actor initiates the discussion or conversation or inclusion of other actors and emphasizes the collaborative aspect of the work, I think the other actors may come to their own view of the initiator as influential. Of course, I frame this against the backdrop of timing of soft power in public diplomacy, which focuses on lasting relationships, and so this process of letting other actors eventually come to their own conclusions about who to look to for influence may take a very long time.

Overall, I think that striking a balance between "Power Over" and "Power With" depends upon the level of importance of the strategy, which could also be muddled with political and economic factors. My suggestion for putting these together would be to institute collaborative power strategies when you can (most likely smaller, micro-level public diplomacy) and exert influence more directly for larger foreign policy objectives. This could have drawbacks, such as foreign and domestic publics easily recognizing the vacillation between the two, but they are difficult concepts to combine without showing some cracks.

Social Power vs. Soft Power in the Realm of Foreign Policy

Joseph Nye describes soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” As the world advances to a globalized community with greater access to communication tools, soft power has become a dominant force in every day life. However, is soft power the best term in foreign policy makers? In the sphere of foreign policy, social power can better categorize the actions and intentions of foreign policy makers.

Soft power focuses more on the diffusion of culture, political ideals, and policies, which can help promote a state’s international image, but in the realm of foreign policy, soft power is too passive. Social power on the other hand, which Van Ham describes as “the ability to set standards and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable without resorting to coercion or payment” is more suited to the realm of foreign policy making as it takes more of an active role.  Social power is more proactive as it advocates new standards, norms, and values, which is a large part of foreign policy making. Soft power is more “being “ than “doing”, and traditional foreign policy methods encourage direct behavior in achieving certain objectives.

Soft power has 3 key limitations that might deter foreign policy makers: the issue of time, control, and credibility. Soft power is a central aspect to foreign policy and public diplomacy efforts, but the effectiveness of soft power is difficult to measure and most often the effects seen after long periods of time. As Wilton indicates, soft power can be difficult for policy makers as  “it offers less scope than harder instruments to demonstrate achievements in foreign policy goals”. As is such, soft power results offer the long term do not serve well for the short-term elected officials who often demand short-term accomplished goals to promote to the public.

Once soft power has been unleashed, it is difficult to control it as the “success in terms of outcome is more in the control of the target than often the case with hard power” (Nye). The diffusion of a certain culture or government policy leaves the perception and opinion to the targeted audience. Whether it is received positively or negatively depends on the public. For foreign policy makers, the lack of control on the outcome of an initiative rooted in soft power is difficult to grasp.

In order for soft power to be effective, the perception of credibility/legitimacy by the public is paramount. If the people do not legitimately recognize a state often, its attempt of soft power is viewed as propaganda efforts to influence the public. The role of the government is to empower the citizens to create communication lines to increase the powers of attraction. Also, as soft power needs the cooperation of international players such as NGO’s, trans and supranational network, legitimacy first needs to be established.

Soft power can be an effective tool, but might not be the best term to adequately apply to the foreign policy realm. As social power supports a greater sense of advocacy and the establishment of international norms it is better suited. Van Ham’s assessment of social power in the international realm is very comprehensive but he lacks a clear distinction between soft power and social power. Soft power though a great tool for promoting ideas can also be very limiting to policy makers in the issue of time, control, and legitimacy.